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THE ALTMAN CORPORATE FAILURE PREDICTION MODEL: APPLIED  
AMONGST SOUTH AFRICAN MEDICAL SCHEMES 
 
This study has a number of interrelated objectives that seek to understand and 
contextualize the Altman bankruptcy prediction model in the setting of the South African 
medical schemes over a ten year period (2002 to 2011). The main objective of this 
study is to validate the Altman Z2 model amongst the medical schemes in South Africa; 
in terms of accurately classifying Z2-scores of ≤ 1.23 and ≥ 2.9 into the a priori groups of 
failed and non-failed schemes. 
The average classification rates in the period 2002 to 2011 are as follows: 82% 
accuracy rate and 17.9% error rate. A linear trend line inserted in the graph shows the 
accuracy improving from 72% to 91% between the period 2003/2004 to 2011/2012.  
This outcome is consistent with the conclusion in previous studies (Aziz and Humayon, 
2006: 27) that showed the accuracy rates in most failure prediction studies to be as 
follows: 84%, 88%, and 85% for statistical models, AEIS models and theoretical models 
respectively.  
Although this study validated the Altman model, further studies are required to test the 
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1. Introduction  
 
South African (SA) medical schemes constitute a significant sector of the economy in 
terms of the number of schemes as well as the reserves under management. As at 31 
December 2011 “there were 97 medical schemes (26 open and 71 restricted), 
representing a total of 8 526 409 lives” (Council for Medical Schemes (CMS) annual 
report, 2011: 114). In 2011 schemes managed a total combined fund of R36.8 billion, 
13% higher than 2010. 
Medical schemes operate as not for profit organizations regulated under the Medical 
Schemes Act, No. 131 of 1998. There has not been any significant change in the 
competitive structure as well as service delivery model of this sector since the birth of 
democracy in South Africa. The sector and the entire health care industry have thus not 
delivered on the national aspirations of achieving equitable and affordable health care 
for all South Africans. This realization has driven the ruling party and South African 
government to consider an alternative healthcare funding and delivery model in the form 
of National Health Insurance (NHI), which is in its advanced stages of conceptualization 
and early stages of implementation. The NHI will in all likelihood expedite an 
unprecedented consolidation in the medical scheme sector that will result in a few 
surviving schemes that sell augmented services not provided for in the NHI benefit 
structure. 
This section will provide a background to the problems the medical scheme sector is 
currently facing, which are: failure of significant growth in membership, high medical 
inflation and its contributing factors, the high burden of disease in South Africa, the 
competitive structure of the private health care industry as well as the role of the 
solvency ratios as a tool to monitor schemes‟ capital adequacy.  
 




1.1. Failure of significant membership growth amongst SA medical schemes 
 
Membership growth of medical schemes remained stagnant between 2000 and 2004 
(Exhibit 1). The growth observed between 2005 and 2011 was in the restricted 
schemes (employer schemes) whilst there was a decline in numbers in open schemes 
(CMS annual report, 2011: 114). The Government Employee Medical Scheme (GEMS), 
which is a restricted scheme, largely accounted for this growth. During this period (2005 
to 2011) the number of beneficiaries grew from just under 7 million to around 8.5 million.  
 
Exhibit 1: Trend in number of beneficiaries on medical schemes (2000 to 2011) 
 
                            CMS Annual Report (2011: 114) 
Open schemes showed negative growth between 2006 and 2011. This trend could be 
because open schemes are voluntary and are therefore susceptible to loosing members 
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during difficult economic times as experienced in the period 2007 to 2011. Medical 
schemes spend a significant amount of money on marketing. In 2011 the brokerage 
costs (for all schemes) was R1.4 billion; a 5% increase from 2010 (CMS annual report, 
2011: 134). Despite these exorbitant marketing fees, there has been no significant 
growth in total membership of the sector over the last ten years.                
 
1.2. High medical inflation and its contributing factors 
 
High medical inflation is one of the main factors contributing to the failure of the private 
health care system in South Africa. The current private health care financing system is 
the root cause of the runaway inflation. Aragua and McIntyre (2012: 1) observed that 
the South African health care system has “an overall progressive financing system but a 
pro-rich distribution of health care benefits”. The above authors lament that the South 
African private health care system mainly covers a small portion of the population that is 
mainly rich (Ataguba & McIntyre, 2012: 1). The authors observe that this small rich 
group that benefits the most from the health care system has the lowest share of the 
disease burden. The above observation has major implications for our healthcare 
system and the sustainability of medical schemes in the private environment. It in effect 
means that the current healthcare system is inequitably accessed and that resources 
are, as a result, inequitably distributed. The behaviour of suppliers is typically influenced 
very strongly by the incentives created by the payment mechanism in the health care 
system (Mackintosh, 2003: 19). The current healthcare system is to a large extent 
supply based rather than needs and demand based. High income health care systems, 
such as is found in South Africa, have strong commercial elements on the supply side 
(Mackintosh, 2003: 17). Service providers such as specialist are the main drivers of the 
supply side. This may present a conflict of interest on the part of the service providers 
who are in a position to prescribe a healthcare intervention from which they are likely to 
derive economic benefits.  
The medical scheme sector has ninety seven individual schemes (as at 2011), all of 
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which provide very similar products. There is often no distinct value differentiation 
amongst the schemes and options. Individual schemes, some of which are very small, 
are often not in a position to negotiate competitive tariff rates with the large South 
African hospital groups, which are displaying the characteristics of an oligopoly 
(Germishuizen, 2009: 38). Medical schemes are therefore price takers whilst hospitals 
are price setters.  
Medical schemes are also under pressure from substitute products like hospital plans 
offered by mainstream insurance companies. The products are often competitively 
priced as they are not governed by and exposed to the risk of prescribed minimal 
benefit (PMB) legislation (Medical Scheme Act (MSA) 131 of 1998), which prescribes 
that schemes have to pay in full (at the price quoted by the service providers) for all 
PMB conditions. The PMB legislation poses a major risk to medical schemes as the 
provisions of the legislation lend themselves to abuse by service providers. According to 
the Towers Watson survey report (2012: 6) the top three global healthcare cost drivers 
are medical technology cost (52%), overuse of healthcare by service providers (50%) 
and profit motive of service providers (31%) in that order.  
In addition to the PMB legislation, medical schemes can no longer choose their 
members or discriminate against members on the bases of claiming patterns, disease 
profile or family size. Survival of medical schemes is therefore dependent upon the skill 
and technology the medical scheme possesses to mitigate claims risk. It has been 
established, that “the number of chronic beneficiaries in a family is an important risk 
factor if a member is classified into a normal claiming category or an above-normal 
claiming category” (De Villiers, Van der Merwe & Van Wyk Kotze, 2004). In addition to 
the skill and technology mentioned above, there needs to be definitive efforts, such as 
disease management programs that specifically address specific disease burdens as 
well as compliance to medications and treatment plans. Smaller schemes are not 
always in a financial position to afford these risk mitigating measures. Even for those 
that can afford them, the success of these measures are not always easily discernible 
and quantifiable, hence scheme executives do not always regard them as priority. 
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Healthcare cost is one of the factors that necessitated the government to consider 
alternative healthcare funding and delivery methods. In their study, Pillay & Skordis-
Worrall (2013: 326) identified certain factors that could have determined the agenda 
setting process for healthcare reform in South Africa such as: “a change in government, 
increase in the cost of private medical schemes, and increase in support for reform from 
various stakeholders”. The framework below (Exhibit 2) illustrates all other contributing 
factors in the policy agenda setting process. 
Exhibit 2: Health care reform agenda setting process in South Africa 
 
               Source: Pillay & Skordis-Worrall (2013: 326) 
 
Medical schemes have been casualties of this escalating healthcare cost, with a 
number of schemes having had to close down or merge into other schemes. The private 
healthcare cost is indeed essential in this framework as it is likely to undermine any 
government initiatives to attaining equitable and affordable healthcare for all South 
African citizens. Hence all government efforts are targeted at containing the escalating 
healthcare costs and this, in government‟s view, will finally be achieved by the 
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introduction of the National Health Insurance (NHI) (Dept. of Health, South Africa, 2011: 
32).  
It does appear at this stage that the NHI will play a significant role in both the financing 
and provision of health care. The role of medical schemes in the financing of healthcare 
has not been well elucidated by the authorities thus far. Some antagonists of the NHI 
feel that the susceptibility of the healthcare system to regulation presents an opportunity 
for policymakers to “achieve social protection objectives through the strategic 
management of markets rather than exclusively through less responsive systems based 
on tax funded direct provision” (van den Heever, 2012: 12). 
 
1.3. High burden of disease in South Africa 
 
The Lancet Special Report (2009: 4, 5) highlights the major healthcare challenges and 
pressures also known as the burden of disease. The following are the elements of the 
so called Quadruple Burden of Disease, according to the Lancet report (2009), currently 
plaguing the South African health care system:  
(i) Maternal, newborn and child health: 1% of global burden (2–3 x average for 
comparable income countries) 
(ii) Non-communicable disease:  < 1% of global burden (2-3 x higher than 
average for developing countries) 
(iii) HIV/AIDS and Tuberculosis (TB): 177% of HIV global burden (23 x global 
average) 5% of global TB burden (7 x global average) 
(iv) Violence and injury: global burden of injuries (2x global average for injuries 
per capita, 5 x global average homicide rate) 
The above categories of disease burdens are way above global averages of peer 
countries, particularly Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immunodeficiency 
Disease (HIV and AIDS) and TB. SA has shown no progress in reaching the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and has instead regressed in some of the goals (The 
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Lancet 2009: 4, 5). It is important to note that most countries have only one or at most 
two categories of Burden of Disease compared to SA which owns four; hence the 
quadruple burden of disease. 
 
1.4. Aging of the medical scheme population 
 
Members of open schemes have demonstrated a significant aging pattern from 2007 to 
2010 (Exhibit 3). There are a number of factors that has led to this trend. The life span 
of the general population has increased as a result of the life-saving medicines 
introduced to the South African market in the past twenty years. The success of the 
Antiretroviral (ARV) treatment program has also played a significant role in curbing 
unnecessary morbidity and mortality from HIV and Aids. Open schemes are more 
vulnerable to the above phenomenon as the age of restricted scheme members is 
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Exhibit 3: Aging trend in medical schemes of SA 
 




There is very little differentiation in the products available to potential medical scheme 
members, as all schemes offer very similar products. The options within the schemes 
range from low cost: which mainly cater for PMBs to high-end: offering more benefits in 
categories such as chronic medicines for non-PMB conditions, optical and dental 
benefits as well as higher specialist fees. The problem medical schemes face is that 
there is no real tangible value offering that differentiates one scheme from the other. 
This makes it easy for members to switch scheme once they encounter a situation 
where another scheme seems to reimburse better for the condition that they intend 
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claiming for in the near future. Some of the competitive strategies employed by medical 
schemes are product augmentation with supplementary services such gym 
memberships and discounts on other insurance products. The MSA 131 of 1998 clearly 
defines the business of a medical scheme and hence most schemes are unable to form 
the above strategic partnerships. 
 
1.6. Porter’s five forces competitive model: in the health care industry  
 
Analyzing the medical scheme industry using the Porter five forces competitive model 
clearly illustrates the structural problems in the industry; and perhaps also hints that 
these problems are unlikely to be resolved to any degree by market forces. The 
following are the elements of the Porter model that will be briefly described in the 
context of the SA medical scheme and health care industries:    
— Threat to new entrants  
— Threat to substitution 
— Bargaining powers of suppliers  
— Bargaining powers of customers 
 
1.6.1. Threat of new entrants 
 
Since medical schemes are not for profit organization, their capital is derived from 
membership contributions. The establishment of such organizations has been easy in 
the past, with no real barriers to entry; hence the high number of medical schemes in 
the country in earlier years. Since medical schemes are strictly governed by the Medical 
Schemes Act 131 of 1998, their business models are similar and in the public domain. 
In recent years, solvency levels have been dropping, dipping below the target figure of 
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25%. Because of the protracted high unemployment rates at and above 24% between 
2009 and 2011 (Statistics SA. 2011), as well as inability of the schemes to compete on 
the basis of innovation, this sector has started to become unattractive and hence has 
not been attracting new entrants in quite a while and instead the number of schemes 
has been reducing as a result of business failures and mergers (Exhibit 16: p58). 
 
1.6.2. Threat of Substitution 
 
Alternative health insurance products such as hospital plans offered by traditional 
insurance houses have been a constant threat to the medical scheme sector. There 
have also been a growing number of insurance products that cover the shortfall 
between what the service provider charges and what medical schemes pay for non-
PMB conditions. These products have the effect that members may buy down to lower 
options with lessor cover for non-PMB conditions.   
 
1.6.3. Bargaining power of suppliers 
 
Because of the concentration of main suppliers such as the hospitals, with effectively 
only four big groups (Netcare, Mediclinic, Life Health and NHN), medical schemes don‟t 
have any bargaining power and therefore reimbursement tariffs (prices) are dictated by 
the hospital groups. This is evidenced by the un-abating increase in the private hospital 
cost portion of medical schemes from 2000 to 2011 as illustrated by the Exhibit 4 
below. Note the sustained growth in hospital and specialist costs from 2000 to 2011. 
The prices of medicines (red line) abated from 2001 with the introduction of Single Exit 
Pricing (SEP) to the pharmacy sector. The government has established a commission 
of enquiry, as of Jan 2014, that will investigate and possibly recommend on the reasons 
for and solutions to the runaway healthcare costs in South Africa. The commission is 
expected to finalize its mandate and produce a report by the end of 2015.  




Exhibit 4: Trends in medical scheme costs drivers (from 2000 to 2011) 
 
Source: Council for Medical Schemes (2011/2012: 119) 
 
Specialists are the second biggest category of cost drivers that medical schemes have 
no control over. This largely emanates from the fact that these suppliers have the 
unrestricted latitude to prescribe a number of interventions from which they benefit 
enormously economically constituting a conflict of interest. Specialists also simply 
charge the member where they are being short paid by the medical schemes (also 
known as double billing). Hospitals and specialists have an uncomfortably close 
relationship with each other; a relationship that would not be tolerated by the 
competition commissions in other industries and other countries. Exhibit 5 below 
depicts the proportional representation of the private hospitals and specialists in the 
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Exhibit 5: Major cost drivers in the private healthcare arena (2011/2012) 
 
        Source: CMS Annual Report (2011-2012: 116) 
 
Because of this uneven distribution of bargaining power across the industry, as well as 
the close relationship between hospitals and specialists, it is not surprising that this 
industry is not responding to normal market forces as other industries do. 
 
1.6.4. Bargaining power of customers 
 
Members are not in a position to negotiate the services they need or the tariffs they 
deem fair for the services. The problem is asymmetry of information where the technical 
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information about the services to members / patients resides with the medical schemes 
and service providers. Medical schemes generally negotiate tariffs with private 
hospitals, against the odds described above. Because of the moral hazard factor 
introduced by medical insurance, patients are generally apathetic to the cost of the 
health care they receive. Belonging to a medical scheme “is the most important 
predictor of using a private provider, particularly for inpatient care” (Alaba & McIntyre, 
2012). 
Switching costs, associated with moving from one scheme to the other, are so 
inconsiderable, that members are continually in a state of flux into and out of schemes, 
a situation that only benefit the brokers. 
 
1.7. Solvency levels of medical schemes 
 
The Medical Schemes Act requires that “medical schemes maintain accumulated funds 
(reserves) as a percentage of gross annual contribution of not less than 25%” (CMS 
Annual Report 2011: 142). The main statutory obligation of the CMS is to ensure that 
schemes at all times remain financially sound at a solvency level of above 25%. 
Schemes that fall below this level are intensely monitored; which includes regular 
submission of management accounts, regular meeting of the Principal Officer (PO) and 
the Board of Trustees (BOT) of the scheme with the CMS, as well as quarterly 
submissions of business plans. Exhibit 6 below depicts the prescribed solvency levels 
in red and the industry averages of all schemes in green. Of note is that the average 
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Exhibit 6: Solvency levels of schemes (2000-2011) 
 
         Source: CMS Annual Report (2011-2012: 142)    
 
1.8. Summary of introduction 
 
The medical scheme industry has failed to thrive and to provide competitive products. 
The main factors stifling schemes growth are the following;   failure of the industry to 
grow members; the aging membership of medical schemes; the unusually high burden 
of disease in South Africa; high medical inflation; as well as the competitive industry 
forces that result in lack of responsiveness of the industry to market forces. Failure to 
grow sales results in the failure to grow reserves. In the current monitoring mechanism 
of medical schemes, a scheme is deemed to be failing if its solvency ratio is equal to or 
below the statutory level of 25%. Raath (2010; 29) argues for a risk based monitoring 
tool which considers the particular risk of each scheme. It is for this reason that this 
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paper explores the possibility of applying the Altman failure prediction model to the 
medical scheme industry.  
 
1.9. Objective of the study 
 
This study has a number of interrelated objectives that seek to understand and 
contextualize the Altman bankruptcy prediction model in the setting of the South African 
medical schemes. The objectives are as follows: 
I. To do research of the literature on the subject of corporate bankruptcy 
prediction models, with a view to establishing what the latest evidence is on 
the validity of the Multivariate Discriminant Analysis (MDA) models in general 
and the Altman model in particular. 
II. To validate the Altman Z2 model amongst medical schemes in South Africa in 
terms of accurately classifying Z2-scores of ≤ 1.8 and ≥ 2.9 into the a priori 
groups of failed and non-failed schemes  
III. Establishing new Z2-scores (and limits) through the re-estimation of new 
coefficients for the original variables (T1 to T5) in the SA medical scheme 
industry: this will be achieved by rerunning the MDA model for the SA medical 
schemes using the original Altman variables (T1 to T5). 
IV. Establishing alternative Z2-scores (and limits): Rerunning the MDA model 
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2. Literature review 
 
When a business or an industry fails there is often a lot of speculation as to the causes 
of such failure. The exact reasons for the failure are often unknown and as a result the 
same mistakes can be repeated. Business failure prediction models attempt to tackle 
this problem to the extent that a business tool can be used to monitor and detect early 
signs of failure. However choosing between these different models for empirical 
application is not always an easy task (Aziz & Humayon, 2006: 18). Predicting business 
failure as early as possible is always essential, particularly in periods of financial stress 
and economic upheaval (Diakomihalis, 2012: 97). Bankruptcy prediction is important for 
financial information users such as investors, creditors, stakeholders, credit rating 
agencies, auditors, and regulators (Lifschutz & Jacobi, 2010: 133). 
The main purpose of corporate failure prediction is to have a methodological approach 
which identifies and discriminates companies with a high probability of future failure 
from those considered to be healthy (Amendola, Bisogno, Restaino et al, 2011: 295). 
The majority of these studies have been on assessing corporate health “to predict 
longevity, with less emphasis on the causes of failures” (Holt, 2013: 50).This is one of 
the criticisms of business prediction failure models, that they seek to predict failure with 
no sufficient understanding of the underlying causes of failure. For some companies 
and industries it might be too late for any rescue operations by the time the company is 
found to fall in the failed category. The counter argument to this is that most of these 
models predict failure two to five years in advance, providing reasonable time to 
marshal rescue efforts.  
 
2.1. Possible Causes of Business Failures  
 
In his work on analyzing causes of business failure, Holt (2013: 62) concluded that the 
generic failure agents (GFA) are shown to be: managerial, financial, company 
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characteristics, and macroeconomic conditions (in order of frequency). The first three 
reciprocally interact within conditions defined by the latter. Each GFA has a number of 
sub-causal agents (SCA) associated with it (Holt, 2013: 60). Holt suggests that 
“innovation can potentially mitigate GFA and SCA negatively or positively” (Holt, 2013: 
60).  
Exhibit 7 below ranks the GFAs based on percentage of frequency; illustrating that 
managerial causes of business failure contribute the most at 45% followed by financial 
causes at 42%. 
Exhibit 7: GFA ranking table 
GFA                                                                           All literature          
 % Rank 
Managerial 45 1 
Financial 42 2 
Macroeconomics 8 3 
Company characteristics  5 4 
 Source: Holt G.D. (2013: 62) 
 
Exhibit 8 below illustrates “the inter-GFA reciprocal influence with the shaded central 
signifying combined failure susceptibility from all GFA combined” (Holt, 2013: 63). It is 
important to note that most of the SCAs constitute the five financial ratios in the Altman 
model which are profitability, liquidity, low asset / high debt, capital turnover ratios, and 
poor revenue vs. liabilities. In this model, innovation plays an important role in 
aggravating or mitigating the impact of the GFA/CSAs. 
Understanding this model can assist in conceptualizing and implementing turnaround 
strategies for a company once the company has been categorized as distressed or 
bankrupt by the Altman failure model. For instance, one of the indicators of financial 
weaknesses is inadequate working capital amongst other things. Inadequate working 
capital can be a sign of other problems in the business such poor financial management 
and procurement strategies. This GFA/CSAs causal agent model also lends support to 
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the criticism that macroeconomic factors are not well represented in most of the earlier 
bankruptcy prediction models. 
Exhibit 8: Model of causal agents (GFA/CSA)
 
 Source: Holt, G.D. (2013: 62) 
Holt (2013: 65) suggests broad practical considerations to help negate the potential 
negative effects of GFA (and respective SCAs). The recommendations suggest 
mitigating measures according to the particular GFA implicated in the framework. The 
following is a summarized version of Holt‟s framework (Holt 2013: 65).    
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GFA1 managerial: select work of a type and within geographic areas that offer the 
organization optimum cost control, maintain up-to-date knowledge on demand, 
competition, clients and suppliers and sustain positive cash flow. Embracing all of these 
propositions simultaneously is a function of managerial risk minimization /mitigation.  
GFA2 financial: maintain effective forecasting and accounting functions, closely monitor 
liquidity, avoid high gearing; achieve appropriate returns on operating resources, control 
income (which includes effective debtor management), avoid poor revenue versus 
liabilities and avoid under capitalization.  
GFA4 company characteristics: interact effectively with all aspects of the business 
operating environment and strive for organizational learning.  
GFA3 macroeconomic environment: maintain a business strategy that mitigates the 
potentially negative impacts, especially from: increased competition, decreasing price 
levels, high costs of borrowing, legislation, recession, and any other “shocks”. 
 
2.2. Statistical basis of the earlier business failure prediction models 
 
The fundamental basis of most business failure prediction models is to examine and 
quantify the independent variables which are effective indicators and predictors of 
business failure or distress (Altman, 2000: 1). Financial ratios are the key input 
variables in most of these models. It is the link between financial ratios and statistical 
techniques that are the essence of statistical bankruptcy prediction modeling. 
 
2.3. Bridging the gap between financial ratio analysis and the more rigorous 
statistical techniques  
 
Financial ratios are commonly used by accountants, managers and analysts to varying 
degrees of understanding and consistency. The use of these ratios often pivots around 
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the comparison of companies in the same industry. The information gathered from such 
analysis is barely helpful in understanding the weaknesses and strengths of a company 
and is of limited use in analyzing the strategic context of a company. As Edward Altman 
observed, from the 1960‟s and more so in the 1990‟s, “academics seem to be moving 
towards the elimination of financial ratios as an analytical technique in assessing the 
performance of the business enterprise” (Altman, 2000: 1). Altman (2000) further 
observed that these academics have started to employ more statistical techniques in 
explaining and predicting the performance of corporates, often in ways that financial 
ratios are unable to do.  The drawback of such statistical techniques has been that they 
have not succeeded in finding their way into everyday business practice. The chasm 
created by these divergent methods of business analysis has been of concern, as there 
are merits in both approaches. Hence Altman‟s question, “Can we bridge the gap 
between financial ratio analysis and the more rigorous statistical techniques which have 
become popular amongst academics in more recent years?” (Altman, 2000: 2).  
 
2.4. Univariate vs. Multivariate Analysis models 
 
Edward Altman, who is well recognized for his work in predictive failure models since 
the 1960‟s, contributed a great deal to the most used model known as the Z-score, 
which primarily utilizes financial ratios in the predictive model. One of the original works 
in the area of ratio analysis and bankruptcy classification was by Beaver (1967), in 
which his univariate statistical analysis of bankruptcy predictors “set the stage for 
Altman and other authors that followed” (Altman, 2000: 2). Beaver found that a number 
of ratios could predict failure in firms for as long as five years prior to bankruptcy 
(Beaver, 1968: 191). In 1972 Deakin, following up on Beaver‟s work, utilized the same 
independent variables used by Beaver in 1968 within a number of multivariate 
discriminant models (Deakin, 1972). The problem of using financial ratios as mentioned 
above is inconsistency which may lead to instances of under estimating or over 
estimating the bankruptcy risk. Altman also has concerns with univariate analysis of 
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financial ratios in bankruptcy prediction models for the reasons that the modeling is 
prone to faulty interpretation and is potentially confusing. Altman argues that “firms with 
poor profitability and/or solvency record may be regarded as potentially bankrupt, 
however because of their above average liquidity, the situation may not be regarded as 
that serious” (Altman, 2000: 8). Multivariate analysis on the other hand introduces the 
contentious questions of “which ratios are most important in detecting bankruptcy, what 
weight should be attached to these selected ratios and how should the weights be 
objectively established” (Altman, 2000: 9). According to Altman, “the importance of the  
multivariate discriminant analytical (MDA) remains its ability to separate companies into 
failed and non-failed entities using multivariate measures” (Altman, 1968: 597). 
Four out of the five variables (excluding sales / total assets) considered in the Altman 
model showed significant differences between the failed and non-failed companies 
(Altman, 1968: 596). Although the fifth variable (sales / total assets) did not display 
significant differences between failed and non-failed firms, the significance of its 
contribution to the model made Altman consider it for inclusion in the model.   
 
2.5. Description of commonly used statistical failure prediction models 
 
The Z-score, used by Altman (1968) in his study of manufacturing firms, uses  MDA 
statistical techniques. MDA in its simplest form is the comparison of two or more 
independent variables between two entities in order to arrive at two estimates, which 
are in turn compared for statistically significant differences. Altman describes MDA as a 
“statistical technique used to classify observations into one or several a priori groupings, 
dependent on the observed individual characteristics” (Altman, 2000: 9). A prior 
groupings in this case meaning predetermined groupings such as male and female or 
medicine „A‟ and medicine „B‟, or in the case of this study “failed and non-failed 
schemes”. The shortcomings of univariate studies is that they only “consider 
measurements used for group assignments; one at a time” (Altman, 2000: 9). The main 
advantage of MDA in classification problems is “the potential of analyzing the entire 
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variable profile of the object simultaneously rather than sequentially examining its 
individual characteristics” (Altman, 2000: 9). The other advantage is that ratios are dealt 
with holistically; thereby addressing the problem of inconsistency.  According to Altman 
(2000: 9), the discriminant function of the model transforms the individual independent 
variables into a single discriminant score, or Z-value which is then used to classify the 
object, where: 
V1, V2,…Vn = discriminant coefficients  
T1, T2,…Tn = independent variable (Altman, 2000: 10).  
T1 is the independent variable such as financial ratios, whilst V1 is the discriminant 
coefficient calculated statistically by the MDA model (Altman, 2000: 10). These 
coefficients are important as they are derived from different circumstances depending 
on the measurement and structure of the different ratios. Different industries are 
therefore expected to have different coefficients. The implicit assumption is therefore 
that the Z-score model is generalizable if the coefficients are constituted correctly.   
 
2.6. The Altman Z-score 
 
In determining the Z-score, Altman used sixty six companies from the manufacturing 
industry, with thirty three of them in the bankrupt group and the other thirty three in the 
non-bankrupt group (Altman, 2000: 10). The bankrupt firms are the ones that filed for 
bankruptcy (from 1946 to 1965) under the United States (US) Bankruptcy Act. The non-
bankrupt companies where chosen by industry as well by their size. The asset size 
range of the companies was restricted to between $1 million to $26 million (Altman, 
2000: 10). The mean asset size of the non-bankrupt companies was slightly greater 
than that of the bankrupt firms (Altman, 2000: 10). Altman asserts that “matching the 
exact sizes of the groups were unnecessary” (Altman, 2000: 10). Total asset size being 
the denominator in the Altman model, doesn‟t seem to have biased the bankrupt firms 
negatively (with smaller total assets); if anything, it would have been a mitigating factor 
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for smaller firms. The financial data of the bankrupt and non-bankrupt companies were 
from the same period. 
In the original Altman study (1968: 594), twenty two potentially helpful financial ratios 
where compiled for evaluation, which were classified into five ratio categories; liquidity, 
profitability, leverage, solvency and activity. To arrive at the final five profiles of 
variables, Altman (1968: 594), followed the following procedure; (i) observation of the 
statistical significance of various alternative functions, including determination of the 
relative contributions (by way of the coefficients) of each independent variable, (ii) 
evaluation of inter-correlations amongst the relevant variables (iii), observation of the 
predictive accuracy of the relevant variables and (iv) judgment of the analyst. Altman 
(1968) finally settled on the following variables and profile: 
 
Z= 0.012T1 + 0.014T2 + 0.033T3 + 0.006T4 + 0.999T5 
Where; 
 
T1 = working capital / total assets 
T2 = retained earnings / total assets 
T3 = earnings before interest and taxes / total assets 
T4 = market value of equity / book values of total liabilities 
T5 = sales / total assets 
 Z = overall index (Z-score) 
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2.7. Descriptions of the ratios used in the Altman Z-scores 
 
From a total number of twenty two ratios put into the Altman model, only five were found 
to be of discriminant value in confirming the a priori groups of companies. Altman 
describes the ratios used in his model as follows (Altman 1968: 594): 
T1 = working capital / total assets. This ratio describes the net liquid assets of a firm 
relative to its total capitalization. Working capital is the difference between a firm‟s 
currents assets and current liabilities. In a loss making firm, this ratio will consistently 
shrink because of: reducing credit extension from suppliers and inability to collect debt 
both  resulting in less sales (besides other reasons such as decreasing demand). On 
the other hand there is also the consequence of less or no retained earnings posted to 
the balance sheet hence stagnating total assets.  
T2 = retained earnings / total assets. This ratio measures cumulative profit over time in 
relation to total assets. Younger firms will have a smaller ratio compared to older firms 
that will have had enough time to accumulate earnings. This is consistent with real life 
observation that new firms are at a higher risk of bankruptcy 
T3 = operating profit / total assets. By dividing the total assets into operating profit, this 
ratio measures the true productivity of the firm in as far as the earnings potential before 
the influence of interest and taxes. Firms with a lower earning generating capacity are at 
risk of bankruptcy. There is collaborative evidence between the ratios when one 
observes that earning generating capacity will increase the numerator in the above ratio 
hence increasing that ratio as well, improving the general wellbeing of the firm. Signs of 
financial distress in a firm can therefore be monitored by observing the trends in these 
ratios long before the Z-score dips into the danger zone.      
T4 = market value of equity / book value of total liabilities. This is one of the debatable 
ratios in the model, as a number of factors other than the intrinsic value of the firm could 
affect the market value of the equity. However the relevance of the market value is in 
the fact that a firm is technically considered bankrupt when the book value of the total 
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liability equals or exceeds the market value of equity. The revised Altman model makes 
provision for private firms as well, by re-estimating the coefficients of this particular 
variable. Medical schemes are private not for profit organizations, that do not have a 
market value of equity as a result. The prediction failure of such firms can therefore be 
determined from the revised Altman model.  
T5 = sales / total assets. The asset turnover ratio is a standard financial ratio illustrating 
the sales generating ability of the firm‟s assets. This ratio “is one measure of 
management capability in dealing with competitive conditions” (Altman, 1968: 595). 
Based on the statistical significance this measure would not have appeared at all (as it 
ranks below 0.001), however because of its unique relationship to other variables in the 
model, sales / total assets ranks second in its contribution to the overall discriminating 
ability of the model (Altman 1968: 596). This is not entirely surprising as sales are often 
the main driver of growth in most forecasting models across most industries. Hence a 
ratio containing sales as a numerator would rank high in contributing to the overall 
discriminating ability of the model.  
 
The zones of discrimination that depend on the Z1 scores are:  
Z1 > 2.99 = Safe Zone  
1.8 < Z1 < 2.99 = Grey Zone  
Z1 < 1.80 = Distress Zone 
 
By observing those firms which have been misclassified by the discriminant model in 
the initial sample, it is concluded that all firms having a Z-score of greater than 2.99 
clearly fall into the "non-bankrupt" sector, while those firms having a Z-score below 1.81 
are all bankrupt; the area between 1.81 and 2.99 will be defined as the "zone of 
ignorance" or "grey area" because of the susceptibility to classification error (Altman, 




In his Z2 model, Altman (1983) estimated the Z-score for private firms; where in T4 
(market value of equity / book values of total liabilities), he substituted the market value 
of equity with the book value of equity. As a result of this re-estimation of variables, the 
coefficients changed from 
 Z= 0.012T1 + 0.014T2 + 0.033T3+ 0.006T4 + 0.999T5 to 
 Z2 = 0.717T1 + 0.847T2 + 3.107T3 + 0.420T4 + 0.998T5 
 
2.8. The relevance of Altman models in modern day prediction of company 
failures  
 
Company failure and failure prediction has become a much talked about and 
researched topic in corporate finance in recent years. The reasons for the renewed 
interest is as a result of “the negative spiral in the general economic environment, the 
increased availability of data and statistical techniques, the extended academic 
research on the impact of market imperfections and information asymmetry and the 
introduction of the New Basel Capital” (Balcaen & Ooghe, 2004:1). 
Balcaen and Ooghe (2004) have studied numerous models (earlier and latter ones), 
particularly comparing their classification results and / or prediction abilities. The results 
of these studies seem to indicate that “we may question the benefits to be gained from 
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Exhibit 9: Overview of the most popular alternative models applied in corporate failure prediction 
Method Main advantages Main drawbacks 
   
Survival analysis — account for time dimension  of 
failure 
— gives likely time to failure 
— no assumption of dichotomous 
dependent variable 
— easy interpretation 
— not designed for classification 
— assumption: failing and non-
failing firms belong to the same 
population 
— sample construction may affect 
hazard rates  
— requires homogenous lengths 
of failure processes in sample 
 
Decision trees — No strong statistical data 
requirements 
— allows for qualitative data 
— can handle noisy and incomplete 
data 
— user friendly: clear output 
 
— specification of prior 
probabilities and 
misclassification costs 
— assumption: dichotomous 
dependent variable 
— relative importance of variables 
unknown 
— discrete scoring system cannot 
be „applied‟ 
Neural networks — does not use pre-programmed 
knowledge base 
— suited to analyze complex patterns 
— no restrictive assumptions 
— allows for qualitative data 
— can handle noisy data 
— can overcome autocorrelation 
— user-friendly: clear output robust 
and flexible 
— requires high quality data 
— variables must be carefully 
selected a priori 
— requires definition of 
architecture 
— possibility of illogical network 
behavior 
— large training sample required 
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2.9. Alternative Popular Models: Survival analysis, Decision trees and Neural 
networks   
 
The alternative models that have increasingly been used in failure prediction in recent 
years are Survival analysis, Decision trees and Neural networks. Exhibit 9 above 
outlines and describes the advantages and disadvantages of these alternative popular 
models.  
What stands out from the features described in the above table is that the survival 
analysis method accounts for time dimension of failure, allows for time-varying 
independent variables (making it easy to incorporate economic data into the model) and 
gives likely time to failure. The last point is perhaps the most important distinguishing 
feature of this model as it adds a prediction dimension to the time of failure. The 
disadvantage of this model is that its assumption is that failing and non-failing firms 
belong to the same population and are only separated over time by survival risk as a 
result of qualities inherent in the independent variables (ratios) and dependent variable 
(economic conditions).  
The decision tree, whilst a relatively simple procedure has the disadvantage that the 
relative importance of the variables is unknown. 
The neural network models are suited to analyze complex patterns, however run the 
risk of illogical network behavior. 
From their review and analysis of these alternative models, Balcean and Ooghe 
conclude as follows; “a closer look at the features of the alternative modeling methods, 
reveals that they are computationally much more complex and advanced than the rather 
simple classical cross sectional statistical methods of MDA, logit, probit and linear 
probability models” (Balcaen & Ooghe (2004): 23). 
Perhaps the most important observation from these authors‟ work is in the conclusion 
that the differences in prediction accuracy appear at first sight not to be statistically 
significant and that the only difference in predictive performances found to be 
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significant, is the difference between the logit model and survival analysis, one year 
prior to failure. And here, the logit method seems to be better than the survival analysis 
model (Balcaen & Ooghe, 2004: 25). Aziz and Humayon (2006: 29) also conclude in 
their findings that “the predictive accuracies of different models seem to be generally 
comparable, although artificial intelligent expert system (AIES) models perform 
marginally better than statistical and theoretical models”.   
It must be stressed that Balcaen and Ooghe (2004) analyzed a big number of studies, 
even beyond the three additional alternative models mentioned, with different research 
methodologies. To tease out accuracy and predictive performance of these models is 
rather a difficult task; and perhaps more studies along the lines of met-analysis need to 
be conducted in order to provide more definitive pronouncement on the performance of 
these models. What is important from this study though is that it does not conclude that 
the MDA or Altman models are inferior to the newer models.     
 
2.10. Prediction Models with a financial statement analysis logic 
 
Amongst the numerous other prediction models, the ones with financial statement 
analysis logic are of particular interest since they can be seen as an additional 
technique to financial analysis. Exhibit 10 below provides a brief description of these 
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Exhibit10: Models with financial statement analysis logic 
Model Main features 
Balance sheet decomposition 
measures (BSDM) / entropy 
theory  
The bases for this model are that firms constantly try to maintain equilibrium in 
their financial structure. If a firm‟s financial statements reflect significant changes 
in the composition of assets and liabilities on its balance-sheet it is more likely 
that it is incapable of maintaining the equilibrium state. If these changes are likely 
to become uncontrollable in future, one can foresee financial distress in these 
firms. 
Cash Management Theory  Short-term management of corporate cash balances is a major concern of every 
firm. An imbalance between cash inflows and outflows would mean failure of the 
cash management function of the firm, persistence of which may cause financial 
distress to the firm and, hence, bankruptcy. 
Gambler‟s ruin theory  
 
In this approach, the firm is constantly playing the probability of loss, continuing 
to operate until its net worth goes to zero (bankruptcy). With an assumed initial 
amount of cash, in any given period, there is a net positive probability that the 
firm‟s cash flows will be consistently negative over a run-off period, ultimately 
leading to bankruptcy. 
Credit risk theories 
 
Credit risk theories are linked to the Basel I and Basel II accords and mostly refer 
to financial firms. 
Credit risk is the risk that any borrower/counterparty will default, for whatever 
reason. Following the Basel II guidelines, a number of recent attempts have 
been made to develop internal assessment models of credit risk. 
Source: Modified from Aziz and Humayon (2006: 19) 
 
The ranking below (Exhibit 11) suggests that “the performance of MDA and Logit 
models (with lower adjusted standard deviations of 0.34 and 0.47, respectively) may be 
more reliable” (Aziz & Humayon 2006: 26). 
Among the individual models the MDA was the most employed at 30.2% of the total. 
The average overall predictive accuracy (OPA) of all the models is 85.2% of which that 
of MDA is 85%, ranking it very well amongst its competitor models, both in its category 
of statistical models and other categories such as artificially intelligent expert systems 
(AEIS) and Theoretical Models (Exhibit 12 below). 
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Exhibit 11: Proportion of models categories employed by past studies 
 
      Source: Aziz & Humayon (2006: 26) 
 
Exhibit 12: Overall predictive accuracy of different model categories 
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2.11. Theoretical debates around the earlier bankruptcy models 
 
In her article, Evolution of the Bankruptcy Studies, Cybinski (2001), raises a few 
theoretical but valid arguments pointing to the potential weaknesses of the current 
bankruptcy models in general. She argues that “bankruptcy models have been 
concerned with prediction of bankruptcy before there is even a theoretical explanation of 
the phenomenon of bankruptcy” (Cybinski 2001: 29). Cybinski concedes that the early 
bankruptcy models, of which the Altman models are part, have had varying degree of 
successes in classifying companies into the bankrupt and non-bankrupt categories. The 
success of the earlier models is that researchers have been able to apply the 
techniques of MDA or logit analysis to the groups of healthy and distressed firms to 
produce classification instruments as well as predicting new cases from the derived 
formulae (Cybinski 2001: 29). The other shortcoming inherent in the logit and MDA 
analysis is that the dependent variable of failures “is not a dichotomy but rather a 
continuum” (Cybinski 2001: 30). Cybinski then makes the assertion that the model 
formulations, not surprisingly, are most successful, “when the data conforms to the 
expectation that the two groups are already separated on this continuum –i.e. bankrupt 
and non-risky surviving group” (Cybinski 2001: 31). 
Mensah, in considering the importance of economic conditions in the timing of 
bankruptcy, asserts that the actual occurrence of bankruptcy is usually dependent on 
coupling of the correctly identified characteristics of failing companies with certain 
economic events (Mensah, 1984: 393). These observations suggest that if a firm is 
already vulnerable to failure, tight labour market conditions and low levels of 
expenditure in the economy at this time can have disastrous consequences on the 
ultimate solvency of the firm (Cybinski 2001: 37). 
 
2.12. Generalizability of the Altman Z-score 
 
Grice and Ingram (2001) question the generalizability of Altman's model and their 
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argument is based on the fact that the model was used to study companies from the 
1950s and 1960s. The questions they ask in their paper are: (i) is Altman's original 
model as useful for predicting bankruptcy in recent periods as it was for the period in 
which it was developed and tested, (ii) is the model as useful in predicting bankruptcy of 
non-manufacturing firms as it is for predicting that of manufacturing firms, (iii) is the 
model as useful in predicting financial distress conditions as it is useful in predicting 
bankruptcy (Grice & Ingram, 2001: 53). 
Grice and Ingram‟s results suggest that better accuracy can be achieved by re-
estimating the coefficients using samples from periods close to the test periods (Grice & 
Ingram, 2001: 60). This statement is not necessarily in contradiction to the Altman 
model since the Altman models lend themselves to improvement by using updated 
coefficients. Altman himself is open to the idea of reshuffling the coefficients in 
accordance with the situation and type of industry under study.  Altman has 
continuously been improving his models to such an extent that his latest model called 
the Zeta-score is slightly different from the Z-score both in the way the coefficients have 
changed as well as the fact that additional ratios have been used. Grice and Ingram‟s 
concerns are based on studies performed by various authors indicating that coefficients 
of the independent variables change over different economic periods.  Begley et al 
(1996: 268) also showed that “although models perform relatively well during the period 
in which they were estimated, they do not perform well in more recent times even when 
the coefficients were re-estimated”. Grice and Ingram‟s (2001: 54) deduction therefore 
is that “it is unlikely that Altman‟s model performed equally well in all financial periods”. 
This is understandable as inflation increases the cost structure whilst interest rates will 
increase the cost of debt as well as credit availability in turn.  
The second concern of Grice et al (2001) is whether the models hold in companies 
other than manufacturing. Platt and Platt (1991: 1193) showed that bankruptcy models 
that included industry-relative ratios produced improved prediction accuracy compared 
to models that only included unadjusted ratios. The Platt and Platt (1991) study doesn‟t 
shed new light on the topic as this point had been factored in by Altman when he 
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proposes that coefficients need to be re-estimated for different industries.  
The third concern of Grice et al is whether the Altman model can predict financial 
distress as well as it predicts bankruptcy. The Altman model does grade the possibility 
of bankruptcy as unlikely, indifferent and most likely. This in itself can be seen as 
degrees of financial distress. Since this a quantitative model, one cannot expect any 
further qualitative descriptions of types and causes of financial distress. It suffices to say 
that the lower the Z-score the more the financial distress and therefore the higher the 
risk of bankruptcy. Altman also observed that “all of the discriminant coefficients 
displayed positive values”, suggesting that the greater the firms distress potential, the 
lower the discriminant score (Altman, 2000: 15). 
The essence of the results of the Grice and Ingram study is that “because ratio 
coefficients are not stable over time, over different industries as well as amongst 
representative proportionate samples of bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms, to improve 
the accuracy of the Z-scores in these settings, ratios need to be re-estimated for the 
different settings” (Grice el al 2001: 60). This is not in contradiction to Altman‟s view-
point but rather serves to emphasize the need for re-estimating ratio coefficients and 
improving the model, as Altman himself has been doing. 
Ooghe and Balcaen (2007: 33) studied the generalizability of the following models on a 
Belgian dataset; Gloubos-Grammatikos, Keasey-McGuinness, Ooghe-Joos-De Vos, 
Zavgren, Altman and Bilderbeek models. The Altman and Bilderbeek models showed 
very poor results in this study (Ooghe & Balcaen, 2007). The methodology of this study 
was to include only models estimated with linear discriminant analysis and logistic 
regression. However the Altman model (1968) which is an MDA model is also validated 
in this dataset. This could be the reason why Altman‟s model performed poorly.  
Diakomihalis (2012) studied the bankruptcy predictions for different hotel categories in 
Greece, aiming to determine the zone of discrimination classified as a certainty for 
bankruptcy. The hotel industry on one level is similar to the healthcare industry in that it 
is a service industry where there are no commodities sold and therefore no high figures 
of cost of goods sold or inventory management. On the other hand hotels could hold 
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very high total assets if the buildings are owned by the entity. Diakomihalis (2012: 109) 
illustrated that the Altman model holds well in service industries, with the Z1 and Z2 
models attaining a very close accuracy level of 88.24 and 83.33 respectively.     
Court and Radloff (1993: 19) proposed a two stage prediction failure model that takes 
into account the macroeconomic realities of the time the firm is being assessed. The 
model proposed is a significant departure from the traditional method of failure 
prediction whereby a single failure prediction score was obtained using only micro-
economic variables. This model makes perfect sense from an academic perspective, 
however it is questionable whether this will find widespread business application as this 
model is complex to grasp and apply.   
In addition to failure prediction, the Altman model can and has been applied to improve 
investment decisions.  There has been close correlation between the Z-scores and the 
market values of stocks (Altman, 1968: 608). 
It suffices to conclude this section by noting that Altman states that “while a subset of 
variables is effective in the initial sample, there is no guarantee that it will be effective 
for the population in general” (Altman, 2000: 16).   
 
2.13. General limitations of prediction failure models 
 
Corporate bankruptcy prediction is inherently vulnerable to problems arising from small 
samples as most firms with publicly available data do not go bankrupt (Aziz and 
Humayon 2006: 23). Small sample size may lead to Type I and Type II errors in 
hypothesis testing. Another source of Type I and Type II errors in prediction studies is 
the fact that the final estimate (such as the Z-score) is a continuum and not 
dichotomous. The zones of discrimination that depend on the Z1 score are:  
Z1> 2.99 = Safe Zone  
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1.8 < Z1< 2.99 = Grey Zone  
Z1< 1.80 = Distress Zone 
Classifying bankruptcy into safe zone, grey zone and distressed zone lends itself to 
misclassification, leading to Type I and Type II errors. Researchers conducting studies 
of any nature in most cases hypothesize that “a relationship between the investigated 
variables exists” (Cashen & Geiger, (2004: 154). Cashen and Geiger (2004: 154) further 
clarify that “statistical inference tests posit a null hypothesis (Ho: the phenomenon under 
investigation is absent, or there is no, or at best a trivial difference between the 
parameters being tested), which researchers contrast against the alternative hypothesis 
(Ha: the phenomenon is present, or there is a difference in the parameters being 
tested)”. Because the null hypothesis is typically rejected, the probability that such a 
decision would be erroneous (Type I error) has to be assessed in the form of α (alpha). 
There is also the probability (β) of failing to reject the null hypothesis when it is actually 
false. Such an error is commonly referred to as a Type II error and is usually less 
serious than the Type I error.  
 
2.14. Summary of themes: main arguments and rebuttals 
 
The arguments and rebuttals in the literature searched have been summarized and 
classified into the themes outlined in Exhibition 13 below. It seems that Altman 
anticipated the kind of criticism against his models and hence preempted universal 
arguments that rebut most of the criticism against his models.  
All the different bankruptcy prediction models have their pros and cons. Altman came 
under some criticism but his rebuttals make it a sufficiently robust model to use.  The 
strength of the Altman model is that it can be applied over different economic periods in 
different types of industries and the model classifies financial distress into different  
categories.  
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Exhibit 13: Main themes, arguments and rebuttals 
Themes Main arguments  
Causes of business failure 
 
Holt (2013) 
Generic failure agents (GFA) are shown to be; managerial, financial, company characteristics, and 
macroeconomic conditions (in order of frequency): of which the first three reciprocally interact within 
conditions defined by the latter. Each GFA has a number of sub-causal agents (SCA) associated with it. 
Statistical basis of predictive models  
 
Altman (2000) 
Univariate modeling is prone to faulty interpretation and is potentially confusing 
Multivariate introduces the contentious questions of „which ratios are most important in detecting 
bankruptcy, what weight should be attached to these ratios‟.  




Z= 0.012T1 + 0.014T2 + 0.033T3 + 0.006T4 + 0.999T5 
Where; 
T1 = working capital / total assets , T2 = retain earnings / total assets,  T3 = earnings before interest 
and taxes / total assets , T4 = market value of equity / book values of total liabilities ,  T5 = sales / total 
assets 
Z = overall index 
Z-score zones: (Z1 > 2.99 = Safe Zone ), (1.8 < Z1 < 2.99 = Grey Zone)  and  (Z1 < 1.80 = Distress 
Zone) 
Z2 Model for Private firms 
 
Altman (1983) 
Coefficients changed from: 
Z1 = 0.012T1 + 0.014T2 + 0.033T3+ 0.006T4 + 0.999T5 to  
Z2 = 0.717T1 + 0.847T2 + 3.107T3 + 0.420T4 + 0.998T5 
The relevance of Altman in modern 




Balcaen and Ooghe (2004) 
“We may question the benefits to be gained from using the more sophisticated alternative methods” 
Alternative & popular models: 1) Survival analysis (gives likely time to failure) , ii) Decision trees and 
Neural networks  are computationally much more complex, iii) The predictive accuracies of different 
models seem to be generally comparable, although and  iv) artificially intelligent expert system models 
perform marginally better than statistical and theoretical models   
 
Predictive accuracy of various models 
Aziz and Humayon (2006) 
Statistical models = 84%,  AEIS models  = 88% and Theoretical models = 85% 
 
Theoretical debates on earlier 
bankruptcy models  
Cybinski (2001) 
(Mensah (1984)  
“Models are predictive with no theoretical explanation of the phenomenon of bankruptcy “Dependent 
variable of failure is “not a dichotomy but rather a continuum” 
Vulnerable firms are pushed into failure by economic conditions (tight labour conditions and low levels 
of expenditure) 
Generalizability of Altman's model 
 
Grice and Ingram  (2001) 
Mensah (1984) 
Begley et al (1996) 
Are Altman models generalizable over:  
— Different economic periods; coefficients change of different economic periods, interest rates 
and credit availability 
— Different types of industry 
— Can they identify and classify financial distress 




Procedure in building model: 
(i)  observation of the statistical  significance of   variables (coefficients), (ii) evaluation of inter-
correlations amongst the relevant   variables 
 (iii) observation of the predictive accuracy of the relevant variables &     
(iv) judgment of the analyst. 
Limitations of prediction failure models 
Aziz & Humayon (2006) 
Small samples may lead to misclassification (Type I and Type II errors) 
(Z1 > 2.99 = Safe Zone), ( 1.8 < Z1 < 2.99 = Grey Zone) and (Z1 < 1.80 = Distress Zone) 
Own creation (2013) 
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3. Research Methodology 
 
The data was gathered from the website of the Council for Medical Schemes (CMS) of 
South Africa. The CMS is a statutory body that‟s primary objectives are to protect the 
rights and entitlement of members as well as ensuring that schemes, at all times, keep 
an adequate level of reserves to be able to meet their claims paying obligation in the 
unlikely but plausible event of a catastrophe that results in a significant number of 
members seeking and receiving medical care around the same time. The CMS collects 
and reports on comprehensive financial information on medical schemes annually. This 
information is made publicly available on the CMS website 
(www.medicalschemes.com). 
 
3.1. Data selection and preparation 
 
The data set was inclusive of both open and restrictive schemes. In the period 2002 to 
2011 the data set consists of 153 schemes. Failed schemes are defined as those 
schemes whose reference numbers had dropped off the register of the CMS by the end 
of the period under study. As a result of the definition used for failed schemes, no 
restrictions were applied to include or exclude schemes into the study. The financial 
statements analyzed were from 2002 to 2011 (same fiscal period) for both failed and 
non-failed schemes. The financial statements of the schemes were adjusted for 
differences in reporting style prior to and after 2004, as most medical schemes 
introduced saving accounts from 2005. The naming convention in medical scheme 
financial statements is slightly different to that in general accounting. Exhibit 14 below 
illustrates the accounting naming convention of medical schemes compared to that in 
general accounting. 
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Exhibit 14: Accounting naming convention for medical schemes 
General Accounting naming convention  Medical schemes naming convention 
  
Sales  Gross contributions 
EBIT (Earnings before interest and Tax) Net healthcare results 
Net earnings / (loss) Net surplus /(deficit) after consolidation results 
Net working capital Net working capital 
Book value of equity Net assets 
Total liabilities Total liabilities 
Total assets Total Assets 
Source: Own Creation, 2013 
 
The financial information collected were parameters constituting the ratios similar to that 
in the Altman Z2 model. Information collected from the income statements was net 
contribution, net healthcare result, net surplus (deficit). The financial information 
collected from the balance  sheet was trade and other receivables, trade and other 
payables, cash and cash equivalents, outstanding claims provisions, savings liability, 
total assets, net assets and solvency ratios. 
 
3.2. Special considerations and assumptions in data selection  
 
(i) The Altman Z2 was used since medical schemes are not listed entities and 
therefore would not have market capitalization, hence the net assets were 
used instead of market capitalization.  
(ii) Schemes generally do not carry much debt as a result most schemes did 
not have much long term debt on their balance sheets; outstanding claims 
provision and savings liability were included as scheme‟s long term debt – 
the reason for considering the above as long term debt and not short term 
debt was because these items were not included in the short term debt of 
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schemes as reported by the CMS. 
(iii) The definition of failed schemes is all schemes whose reference numbers 
fell off the data base in the period 2002 to 2011 – this assumption was 
made as it would have been impossible to accurately determine which 
schemes had indeed failed as there was so many mergers in the period 
and there was no legal declaration of bankruptcy amongst schemes as in 
the Altman study. This assumption has potential implications as it is likely 
to decrease the classification accuracy as well as increase the Type I and 
Type II error rates. 
(iv) A decision was made not to eliminate outliers as this would have further 
reduced the already small sample size – this has a potential of skewing 
the data.  
Gross contributions were preferred over Net contributions the rationale being that 
the savings liability was going to be added to total debt hence the entire 
contributions had to be considered.  
3.3. Sample selection and time period 
 
A times series case study approach was used in order to document the financial ratios 
and the Altman Z2 score of all medical scheme (failed and non-failed) over a ten year 
period; from 2002 to 2011. This period was chosen to allow for a significant period of 
time in order to increase the chances of observing a significant number of scheme 
failures. New schemes were added and removed from the data base as schemes were 
registered and deregistered along the ten year period. 
The term “failed” is preferred over bankrupt schemes since bankruptcy was not 
established. The definition of failed schemes is any scheme that ceased to exist 
irrespective of the cause for such cessation.  
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3.4. Variable Selection and adjustments 
 
The variables selected were those applied by Altman in his work estimating the Z-score 
(Z2) for private firms (Altman, 1983). The ratios selected are as follows: 
 
T1 = (current assets – current liabilities) / total assets 
T2 = Net surplus (deficit)/ total assets 
T3 = Net healthcare results / total assets 
T4 = Net assets / book values of total liabilities 
T5 = Gross contributions / total assets 
 
The coefficients applied were kept the same as worked out by Altman in his original Z2 
model and were only changed when the medical scheme Z-scores were calculated:  
The Z equation used was the original Altman Z score equation as below:  
Z2 = 0.717T1 + 0.847T2+ 3.107T3+ 0.420T4 + 0.998T5 
The zones of discrimination depending on the Z2 score are: 
Z2 > 2.9 = Safe Zone  
1.23 < Z2 < 2.9 = Grey Zone  
Z2< 1.23 = Distress Zone. 
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3.5. Practical steps in the methodology 
 
The methodology applied is a modification of the work by Moghadam et al (2003) which 
outlined similar steps as below: 
(i) Failed schemes were identified by documenting serial financial data of all 
schemes in the period 2002 to 2011. The discontinuation or appearance of a 
scheme‟s reference number and data on the database would alert that a 
scheme had been discontinued or registered respectively. The 
discontinuation or registration was confirmed by the explanatory notes and 
comments on discontinued and registered schemes in the CMS report.  
(ii) Discontinued schemes (both open and restricted) were classified as failed 
schemes whilst continuing schemes were classified as non-failed schemes. 
(iii) The required financial data was extracted to calculate the ratios (T1 to T5) of 
the schemes.  
(iv) The required financial ratios of the schemes were calculated. 
(v) The means of the financial ratios were determined as well as the statistical 
significance between those of failed and non-failed schemes. 
(vi) The Altman model in the SA medical schemes was validated by the following 
means: 
— a) Comparison of variables (T1 to T5) and Z-scores of failed and non-failed 
schemes using the Mann-Whitney test 
— b) Correlation matrices of the independent variables in relation to the Z-score 
— c) Classification and error rates of the Altman prediction model in SA medical 
schemes (the predictions were based on data one and two years prior to 
failure).  
(vii) New Z-score were established by re-estimation of new coefficients: the MDA 
was rerun using original variables (T1 to T5). The new Z-score was 
established through the following steps (Altman, 1968):  
— a) Of the schemes already existing in 2002, the schemes that had failed in the 
period 2002 to 2011 were selected; of those selected schemes the data of 1 
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year prior to their failure was analyzed. Firms that did not have data 1 year 
prior to failure were excluded (for instance a firm failing in its first year of 
operation was excluded).  
— b) Of the schemes already existing in 2002, the schemes that had not failed in 
the period 2002 to 2011 were selected (those that were still in existence at 
the end of the period). 
— c) Thus a basic sample of 42 failed firms and 92 non-failed firms was arrived 
at, prior to any matching. Failed firms had total assets ranging from R1 487 
000.00 to R781 355 000.00. All non-failed firms falling outside this range were 
excluded, resulting in a final sample of 42 failed firms and 81 non-failed firms. 
This exercise was to try and match schemes by asset size (similar to what 
Altman did in his study). 
— d) An MDA was then performed using exactly the same variables (ratios) as 
previously used (T1 to T5). 
(viii) An alternative Z-score was established: The MDA model was rub again using 
new variables. 
The new variables were selected from what was thought to be significant 
drivers of sustainability of medical schemes. The following variables were 
selected:  
— (current assets – current liabilities)/ Gross contributions   
— Total assets / Gross contributions   
— Net assets / Gross contributions  
— Net healthcare results / Gross contributions 
— Solvency ratios 
The gross contribution was chosen as it is a significant denominator in most 
ratios in accounting. The solvency ratio also has the gross contribution as a 
denominator. 
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3.5.1. Calculation of accuracy (classification and error rates) 
 
 
It is important to contextualize the methodology employed in the accuracy 
calculation. The purpose of the original Altman research (1968) was to devise 
a tool that could predict a company‟s fate in terms of the following categories: 
failed, non-failed and indeterminate. The question of accuracy calculation 
methodology was never dealt with in the study since Altman never had to 
validate his own model. However for other researchers seeking to validate the 
Altman model in different countries and circumstances, the methodology of 
calculating accuracy becomes essential.  
It is statistically more appropriate to exclude the counts of the grey areas (the 
schemes which are indeterminate with regards to having failed or not failed). 
This calculation is appropriate in a 2 by 2 table context only, and not in the 2 
by 3 table (which includes those companies falling into the grey zone). If the 
above formula is used in context of the 2 by 3 table, then the denominator in 
our accuracy and error classifications includes the schemes in the 
indeterminate grey zone, which are thus not represented in the numerator at 
all.  
This study will show classification and error rates in which grey zones counts 
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3.5.2. Methodology used for reestablishing alternative Z-scores was as follows 
 
  
A stepwise model building procedure was followed in order to obtain the 
“best” model. Both forward (add-on) and backward (deduction) models were 
run with the following specifications:  
Forward build: Tolerance of 0.03, F to enter of 0.5, F to removal of 0.0. 
Backwards build: Tolerance of 0.03, F to enter of 1.0, F to removal of 0.5.  
Model resulting from Forwards build: T1, T2, T4, T5, b, c, d  
Model resulting from Backwards build: T1, T4, T5, b, c, d 
The Backwards build model was selected given that T2 represents operating 
surplus (deficit) and that d (Net healthcare results / Gross contributions) was 














The results of the study will be reported on in the following format: 
(i) Descriptive statistics of the schemes in the CMS database 
(ii) Validation of the Altman Z2 model amongst the medical schemes in South 
Africa in terms of accurately classifying Z2 scores of ≤ 1.23 and ≥ 2.9 into the 
a priori groups of failed and non-failed schemes respectively. 
(iii) Establishing new Z-scores (and limits) by re-estimation of new coefficients: 
from rerunning the MDA model using original variables (T1 to T5). 
(iv) Establishing alternative Z-scores (and limits): by rerunning the MDA model 
using new variables. 
 
4.1. Basic descriptive statistics 
 
Exhibit 15 below depicts the numbers and percentages of failed schemes in the data 
set in the period 2002 to 2011. 
 
Exhibit 15: Number and frequency of failed schemes (both open and closed) in the period 2002 to 2011. 
Year of Failure Freq. Percent Cum. Freq 
2002/2003 8 14.55 14.55 
2003/2004 4 7.27 21.82 
2004/2005 5 9.09 30.91 
2005/2006 5 9.09 40 
2006/2007 4 7.27 47.27 
2007/2008 7 12.73 60 
2008/2009 8 14.55 74.55 
2009/2010 7 12.73 87.27 
2010/2011 7 12.73 100 
Total 55 100   
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There has been no less than at least 7% failure rate per year amongst schemes in this 
period (2002 to 2011)  
Exhibit 16 below depicts the percentage of schemes that failed over the period 
2002/2003 to 2011/2012 amongst open and restricted schemes. There was a higher 
percentage failure rate amongst the open schemes. This phenomenon can be explained 
by the fact that open schemes are more vulnerable as they attract older and sicker 
members compared to restricted schemes that draw their members from a younger 
population that is still in the employ of companies.  
 
Exhibit 16: Percentage of overall failed schemes over the period 2002/2003 to 2011/2012 
Failure Type Total 
Open Restricted 
No 27 71 98 
Yes 25 30 55 
Total 52 101 153 
% Failed  48.1% 29.7% 35.9% 
 
Annexure A depicts a list of all failed schemes (open and restricted), in order of the 
year in which the schemes were registered.  
 
4.2. Validation of the Altman Z-score in the SA medical scheme Industry 
 
There are various observational methods one can use to validate the Altman model in a 
particular setting or industry. The following observations were used in this study; (i) the 
Mann-Whitney test was used in the comparison of variables (T1 to T5) and Z2-scores of 
failed and non-failed schemes, (ii) The Spearman‟s Rho regression analysis was used 
to determine the correlation of the variables (T1 to T5) with the Altman Z2-score for the 
failed and non-failed schemes (open and restricted) (iii) the classification and error rates 
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of the Altman model in SA medical schemes was determined. 
 
4.3. Comparing variables and Z-scores of failed and non-failed schemes  
 
Even within the context of the MDA model, the correlation and coefficients of ratios still 
convey a lot of information about the reason for the differences between the failed and 
non-failed organizations. Exhibit 17 below illustrates a summary of the statistical 
differences (Mann-Whitney test) between ratios of failed and non-failed schemes in the 
period 2002/2003 to 2011/2012. Note the statistical differences are between ratios T2, 
T3, T4 and the Z-score: not only are there statistically different values in the Z-score, 
but also in the ratios T2 (retained earnings / total assets), T3 (earnings before interest 
and taxes / total assets) and T4 (market value of equity / book values of total liabilities).  
 
Exhibit 17: Comparing medians of variables (T1 to T5) and Z-scores for failed and non-failed (all schemes) 
using the Mann-Whitney test (period 2002/2003 to 2011/2012) 
Mann-Whitney Tests: comparison of T1 through 5 and Z 





Median (IQR) Median    
T1 0 (-0.03 - 0.04) -0.01 (-0.04 - 0.01) -1.515 0.1297 NS 
T2 0 (-0.09 - 0.12) 0.06 (0.02 - 0.12) 2.572 0.0101 S 
T3 -0.05 (-0.15 - 0.03) 0 (-0.05 - 0.07) 2.689 0.0072 S 
T4 2.09 (0.82 - 4.58) 5.78 (3.21 - 14.04) 3.976 0.0001 S 
T5 1.2 (0.75 - 3.03) 2.3 (0.87 - 6.17) 1.777 0.0756 NS 
Altman Z 2.69 (1.48 - 4.80) 6.87 ( 3.66 - 11.93) 4.401 <0.0001 S 
 
Exhibit 18 below show that there were statistical differences between the ratios T2, T3, 
T4 and the Z-score of failed and non-failed open schemes, similar to that of the total 
schemes. On the other hand there were statistical differences between the ratios T1, 
T4, T5 and the Z-score of failed and non-failed restricted schemes, different to that of 
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the total schemes.  
Exhibit 18: Statistical differences between ratios of failed and non-failed schemes separately in the period 
2002/2003 to 2011/2012 
Mann-Whitney Tests: comparison of T1 to T5 and Z 





Median (IQR) Median 
Open T1 0 (-0.11 - 0.02) -0.01 (-0.04 - 0.02) 0.352 0.7249 NS 
T2 -0.01 (-0.11 - 0.12) 0.05 (0.02 - 0.12) 2.138 0.0325 S 
T3 -0.09 (-0.18 - 0.07) -0.01 (-0.03 - 0.06) 2.111 0.0348 S 
T4 1.5 (0.35 - 4.05) 3.83 (2.4 - 6.8) 2.752 0.0059 S 
T5 2.22 (1.31 - 4.15) 3.85 (1.25 - 5.56) 1.029 0.3037 NS 
Z 3.43 (0.79 - 4.92) 5.88 (3.71 - 8.52) 2.528 0.0115 S 
Restricted T1 0.02 (0 - 0.05) -0.01 (-0.04 - 0.01) -2.509 0.0121 S 
T2 0.02 (-0.04 - 0.15) 0.06 (0.01 - 0.12) 1.37 0.1708 NS 
T3 -0.03 (-0.12 - 0.01) 0.01 (-0.06 - 0.08) 1.643 0.1003 NS 
T4 2.37 (1.77 - 6.75) 7.62 (3.76 - 15.87) 2.4 0.0164 S 
T5 0 (-0.03 - 0.04) 1.97 (0.66 - 7.04) 2.145 0.0319 S 
Z 2.27 (1.48 - 4.62) 7.14 (3.66 - 12.36) 3.517 0.0004 S 
 
 
Annexure B illustrates the descriptive statistics of failed and non-failed schemes of 
open and restricted schemes by year (calculated using the last year for each company - 
either 2011/2012 or the year of failure). 
 
4.4. Correlation between the independent variables and the Z-scores 
 
The correlation of the ratios to the Z-score essentially suggests what ratios are the 
major drivers of the Z-score. By knowing what ratios are the major drivers, one can then 
improve those ratios in order to effect a turn-around of the business. Only in the failed 
open schemes (Exhibit 19 below) was there a statistical difference in correlation 
between the Z-scores and the variables T1, T2, T3 and T4. This pattern is similar to the 
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ratios that displayed a statistically significant difference between failed and non-failed 
companies in the Altman study. In summary, there is always a correlation between T4 
and the Z-score (asset turnover and survival),  in all schemes except open non-failed, 
All the non-failed schemes showed a strong correlation between the T5 and the Z-
score, suggesting that high equity, low debt or both was a significant factor in the 
survival of schemes. It is interesting to note that equity in the case of medical schemes 
is equivalent to reserves.  
 
Exhibit 19: Correlation matrices of schemes in the category of open failed 
Correlation matrix for Failed Open schemes 
 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 Z 
T1 1      
T2 0.1929 1     
0.491      
T3 0.2571 0.9536 1    
0.3549 <0.0001     
T4 0.2607 0.3464 0.1643 1   
0.348 0.2059 0.5585    
T5 -0.0071 -0.2321 -0.1357 -0.5929 1  
0.9798 0.4051 0.6296 0.0198   
Z 0.5929 0.5536 0.55 0.4964 0.075 1 
0.0198 0.0323 0.0337 0.0598 0.7905  
 
 
In general, there was a significant correlation between earnings and equity/ debt ratio 
(T2, T3 and T4) and the Z-score in all the schemes (overall, open and restricted), whilst 
there was a strong correlation between equity/debt ratio and asset turn over (T4 and T5) 
and the Z-score in all non-failed schemes (overall, open and restricted). Note, the fact 
that there is such a strong correlation between T1 and T2 serves as a reasonability 
check, as these two variables are expected to be well correlated as EBIT / Total assets 
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and Net Earnings/ Total assets are closely related to each other.  
 
4.5. Accuracy of the Altman prediction model amongst SA medical schemes 
 
Annexure C shows the trend in accuracy and error rates of schemes classified into 
failed or non-failed category as well as percentages of schemes that could not be 
classified into neither category. Accuracy was assessed and calculated as follows: 
{(True Negatives + True Positives)/Total}. This calculation is appropriate in 2 by 2 table 
context only, and not in the 2 by 3 table (which includes those companies falling into the 
grey zone). If the above formula is used in the context of the 2 by 3 table, then the 
denominator in our accuracy and error classifications includes the schemes in the 
indeterminate grey zone, which are thus not represented in the numerator at all.  
 
4.6.1. Accuracy and error rates calculations with grey area counts included 
 
In this section accuracy was calculated with grey zone counts included. Type I and II 
error rates are provided, together with the overall classification accuracy rate and the 
overall classification error rate. 
•     Type I error is the ratio of failed schemes incorrectly classified to the total  
       number of failed schemes. 
•     Type II error is the ratio of non-failed schemes incorrectly classified to the total 
       number of non-failed schemes.        
•     Classification accuracy is the ratio of correctly classified schemes (failed 
      and non-failed) to the total number of schemes. 
•     Classification error is the ratio of incorrectly classified schemes (failed 
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      and non-failed) to the total number of schemes 
 
Exhibit 20 below illustrates the predictive value of the model over the period 2003 to 
2011; for all schemes one and two years prior to failure. The general trend is that the 
predictive value is 60% and above, with an average combined error rate (Type I and 
Type II errors) of around 10%; except in years 2003/2004 and 2004/2005 for one year 
and two years prior to failure (respectively) where the predictive values are both 48%.  
 
Exhibit 20: Classification rate and error rate of the MDA model for all schemes (over the period 2003 to 2012) 
 
 
Exhibit 21 and 22 below illustrate the predictive values of open and restricted schemes 
respectively with restricted schemes performing better than open schemes in both 














2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008 2008/2009 2009/2010 2010/2011 2011/2012
1 yr prior to failure Classification Rate 1 yr prior to failure Error rate
2 yrs  prior to failure Classification Rate 2 yrs  prior to failure Error rate
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2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008 2008/2009 2009/2010 2010/2011 2011/2012
1 yr prior to failure Classification Rate 1 yr prior to failure Error rate
2 yrs  prior to failure Classification Rate 2 yrs  prior to failure Error rate












2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008 2008/2009 2009/2010 2010/2011 2011/2012
1 yr prior to failure Classification Rate 1 yr prior to failure Error rate
2 yrs  prior to failure Classification Rate 2 yrs  prior to failure Error rate
Linear (1 yr prior to failure Classification Rate)
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4.6.2. Accuracy and error rate classifications excluding the grey area counts   
              
In this section the grey zone counts have been excluded in the accuracy calculation. 
This methodology is favored for the reasons explained above (section 3.5.1. p51). 
Exhibit 23 below illustrates the accuracy and error rates when the grey zone counts 
have been excluded. 
 
Exhibit 23: Classification rate and error rate of the MDA model for all schemes (over the period 2002 to 2011) 
 
 
The accuracy rates are much more superior when the grey zone counts have been 
excluded. The average classification rates in the period 2003 to 2011 are as follows: 
82% accuracy rate and 17.9% error rate. An anomaly was observed in the year 
2005/2006 where the accuracy and error rates are 45% and 55% respectively and 46% 












2 yrs 1 yr 2 yrs 1 yr 2 yrs 1 yr 2 yrs 1 yr 2 yrs 1 yr 2 yrs 1 yr 2 yrs 1 yr 2 yrs 1 yr 2 yrs 1 yr
2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008 2008/2009 2009/2010 2010/2011 2011/2012
Classification Rate Error rate Linear (Classification Rate)
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trend line inserted in the above graph shows that the accuracy improves from 72% to 
91% between the period 2003/2004 to 2011/2012. Open scheme performed as follows: 
84%, 16% and 25% for accuracy rate, error rate and percentage indeterminate 
respectively. Restricted schemes performed better that open schemes: 89%, 11% and 
24% for accuracy rate, error rate and percentage indeterminate respectively. 
 
4.7. Re-estimated coefficients: rerunning the MDA using original variables 
 
This process leads to the generation of the new Z-scores for failed schemes, non-failed 
schemes, as well as their grey zones. These Z-scores will henceforth be named Medical 
Scheme Z-scores (MS_Z-scores). This process is similar to the original analysis Altman 
used to arrive at his original Z-scores. The purpose of this exercise is to see if the re-
estimation of the coefficients will result in an improved classification and error rates, as 
suggested by Altman.     
 
4.8. Classification tables of the new medical scheme Z-score (MS_Z-score) 
 
Exhibit 24 below depicts the classification table of failed and non-failed schemes under 
the new MS_Z-score. 
Exhibit 24: Re-substitution classification table of the MS_Z-score 
True result Classification Total 
Non-Fail Fail 
Non-Fail 61 18 79 
% 77.22 22.78 100 
Fail 20 20 40 
% 50 50 100 
Total 81 38 119 
% 68.07 31.93 100 
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The above classification table is labeled as a re-substitution classification table because 
the same observations used in estimating the discriminant model were classified using 
this model. Note, there is much better classification accuracy in classifying non-failed 
schemes than in classifying failed schemes (81% vs. 38% respectively). 
The re-substitution classification table often provides an overly optimistic assessment of 
how well the linear discriminant function will predict the failure status for observations 
that were not part of the training sample. A leave-one-out (LOO) classification table 
(Exhibit 25 below) provides a more realistic assessment for future prediction. The LOO 
classification is produced by holding each observation out, one at a time building an 
LDA model from the remaining training observations, and then classifying the held out 
observation using this model.  
 
Exhibit 25: LOO re-substitution classification table of the MS_Z-score 
True result LOO Classification Total 
Non-Fail Fail 
Non-Failed 61 18 79 
% 77.22 22.78 100 
Failed 21 19 40 
% 52.50 47.50 100 
Total 81 38 119 
% 68.07 31.93 100 
 
The LOO re-substitution classification model confirms that there is much better  
classification accuracy in classifying non-failed schemes than in classifying failed 
schemes (81% vs. 38% respectively as well).    
Annexure D shows the re-substitution and leave-one-out classifications and posterior 
probabilities for those observations that were misclassified by the LDA model. 
Exhibit 26 below illustrates the probability of being in the failed group (group 1) against 
the value of the discriminant score. This graph can again be regarded as another 
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reasonability check since the curve of the graph is sigmoid as expected. 
 
Exhibit 26: Plotting probability of being in the failed group (group 1) against 
 the value of the discriminant score. 
 
 
4.9. The new equation resulting from the re-estimation of coefficients 
 
Below is the new MS_ Z-score equation that resulted from the re-estimation of 
coefficients:  
Z= -1.77T1 -0.3123T2 -1.733T3 -0.031T4 +0.283T5 
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4.9.1 Medians of the MS_Z values of the failed and non-failed schemes 
 
Exhibit 27 below compares the medians of the MS_Z values following re-estimation of 
coefficients. There is a statistically significant difference (p=0.0004) between the 
medians of the MS_Z values of failed and non-failed schemes. 
 
Exhibit 27: Comparing new MS_Z values of following re-estimation of coefficients 




Non-Failed Z 79 -1.496 3.729 0.214 0.707 0.122 -0.143 0.429 
Failed Z 40 -1.129 6.491 0.995 1.414 0.639 0.117 1.662 
 
Man-Whitney test:   MS_Z= -3.533, p=0.0004 
 
Exhibit 28 below examines individual variables following the process of re-estimation of 
coefficients. There are statistically significant differences between the medians of the 
variables T2 toT5 of failed and non-failed schemes (Mann-Whitney tests). The p values 
for the difference between variables T2 to T5 are p= 0.002, p=0.0017, p=0.001 and 
p=0.0101 respectively. There is no statistically significant difference in the medians of 









Exhibit 28: P value of the medians of the variable T1 to T5 following re-estimation of coefficients 








T1 81 -0.45 0.37 -0.01 0.08 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 
T2 81 -0.81 0.49 0.04 0.15 0.06 0.01 0.11 
T3 81 -0.96 0.26 -0.05 0.18 -0.02 -0.09 0.03 
T4 79 0.76 56.44 9.88 9.93 5.40 3.11 15.16 
T5 81 0.21 4.31 1.46 0.96 1.16 0.76 1.73 
Failed T1 42 -0.60 0.43 -0.05 0.17 -0.05 -0.08 0.04 
T2 41 -2.18 0.46 -0.11 0.41 -0.01 -0.20 0.06 
T3 42 -2.46 0.41 -0.26 0.53 -0.12 -0.35 -0.03 
T4 41 -0.73 27.95 5.86 7.20 2.74 1.01 10.12 
T5 42 0.19 9.66 2.74 2.56 1.67 0.93 3.48 
 
Exhibit 29: Mann-Whitney tests across variables of  failed and non- failed schemes 
Variable Z P 
T1 1.147 0.2515 
T2 3.092 0.002 
T3 3.147 0.0017 
T4 3.284 0.001 
T5 -2.571 0.0101 
 
 
4.9.2. Cut-off values for new MS_Z-score 
 
The cut-off values for the new MS_Z-score are graphically represented in the Exhibit 
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Exhibit30: Cut-off values for the new MS_Z-score 
 
 
New MS_Z-score cut-off values: 
> 1.17 = Non-failed schemes  
0.02 to 1.17 = grey zone 
< 0.02 = failed schemes  
 
 
4.10. Alternative Z-values (Alt_MS-scores): rerunning MDA using new variables  
 
This process leads to the generation of an alternative medical scheme Z-score 
(Alt_MS_Z-scores) for failed schemes, non-failed schemes, as well as those in the  grey 
zone. These Z-scores will henceforth be named Alternative Medical Scheme Z-scores 
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at his original Z-scores. The purpose of this exercise is to see if the re-running of the 
MDA on new medical scheme variables will result in an improved classification and 
error rates, as suggested by Altman.    
A stepwise model building procedure was followed in order to obtain the “best” model. 
Both forward (add-on) and backward (deduction) models were run with the following 
specifications:  
Forward build: Tolerance of 0.03, F to enter of 0.5, F to removal of 0.0. 
Backwards build: Tolerance of 0.03, F to enter of 1.0, F to removal of 0.5.  
Model resulting from Forwards build: T1, T2, T4, T5, b, c, d  
Model resulting from Backwards build: T1, T4, T5, b, c, d 
The new five established variables are therefore:  T1, T4, T5, b, c, and d 
 
4.10.1. Accuracy of the Alt_MS_Z-scores in the failed and non-failed schemes 
 
Exhibit 31 below depicts the classification table of failed and non-failed schemes under 
the Alt_MS_Z-scores.  
 
Exhibit 31: Re-substitution classification table of the Alt_ MS_Z-score 
True result Classification Total 
Non-Fail Fail 
Non-Fail 67 12 79 
% 84.81 15.19 100 
Fail 17 24 41 
% 41.46 58.54 100 
Total 84 36 120 
% 70 30 100 
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The above classification table is labeled as a re-substitution classification table because 
the same observations used in estimating the discriminant model were classified using 
this model. Note, there is much better classification accuracy in classifying non-failed 
schemes than in classifying failed schemes (84% vs. 36% respectively).    
Exhibit 32 below is a leave-one-out (LOO) classification table that provides a more 
realistic assessment for future predictions.  
 
Exhibit 32: LOO re-substitution classification table of the Alt_MS_Z-score 
True result LOO Classification Total 
Non-Fail Fail 
Non-Fail 64 15 79 
% 81.01 18.99 100 
Fail 18 23 41 
% 43.9 56.1 100 
Total 82 38 120 
% 68.33 31.67 100 
 
The LOO re-substitution classification model confirms that there is much better 
classification accuracy in classifying non-failed schemes than classifying failed schemes 
(82% vs. 38%) respectively as well.    
Exhibit 33 below shows good predictive values of failed schemes of select years and 
type of schemes. The rest of the other years had disappointing predictive values which 
are not worth considering. This observation is consistent with the earlier observation 
that there was generally better predictive value in the years prior to the introduction of 
savings (2005).  
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Exhibit 33: Years and type of schemes with good classification and error rates (Alt_MS_Z model) 
Year Year (Pred) Outcome  Overall 
Classification rate 
Overall  
Error rate  
2003/2004 1 yr. prior to failure  Open  85% 15% 
2003/2004 1 yr. prior to failure  Restricted 80% 11% 
2004/2005 2 yrs. prior to failure  Open  87% 13% 
2004/2005 2 yrs. prior to failure  Restricted 81% 11% 
 
Annexure E shows the re-substitution and leave-one-out classifications and posterior 
probabilities for those observations that were misclassified by the LDA model whilst re-
establishing the Alt_MS_Z-score. 
Exhibit 34 below illustrates the probability of being in the failed group (group 1) against 
the value of the discriminant score. This graph can again be regarded as another 
reasonability check since the curve of the graph is sigmoid as expected 
 
Exhibit 34: Plotting probability of being in the failed group (group 1) against the value  
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4.10.2. The Alternative equation resulting from new variables 
 
Below is the Alt_MS_ Z-score equation that resulted from the alternative variables and 
re-estimation coefficients:  
Z= -1.03T1 + 0.034T4 + 0.504T5 - 4.467c - 2.70d + 3.93b 
Note the negative values for T1, c and d. 
 
Exhibit 35 below compares the medians of the Alt_MS_Z values following the 
introduction of new variables. There is a statistically significant difference (p=0.0004) 
between the Alt_MS_Z values of failed and non-failed schemes. 
 
Exhibit 35: Comparing Alt_MS_Z values of failed and non-failed schemes 
Fail 
status 






Non-Fail Z 79 0.44 3.89 1.53 0.69 1.42 1.06 1.91 
Fail Z 41 -0.31 6.41 2.77 1.42 2.52 1.89 3.41 
 
Man-Whitney test: Alt_MS_Z = -5.492, p<0.0001 
 
4.10.3. Cut-off values for Alt_MS_Z-score 
 
The cut-off values for the new Alt_MS_Z-score are graphically represented in Exhibit 
36 below. The limits are very close to that of the revised Altman Z-score for private 
firms.  
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Exhibit 36: Cut-off values for the new Alt_MS_Z-score 
 
Alt_MS_Z-score cut-off values: 
> 3.10      = non-failed schemes  
1.5 to 3.10 = grey zone 
< 1.5       = failed schemes  
 
The Z2 in the Altman model was ≤ 1.23 and ≥ 2.9 for failed and non-failed schemes 






Fanelo James Arens:  Master of Commerce Dissertation, University of Cape Town 
 
73 
5. Discussion  
 
The MDA technique commonly has its application in clinical and biological studies 
where matching the characteristics of the two groups under study is always an 
important part of the exercise, to ensure that no bias is introduced by a significant 
difference in the measurements of the independent variables.  It is therefore not clear 
why Altman did not find it necessary to match the measurement in asset sizes 
especially when asset size is a denominator in at least four of the variables used in the 
Z-score. The asset size of a company is its capacity to generate sales; hence asset 
turnover (sales / assets) has to be an important variable in the model.   
Regarding the generalizability of the model, Altman never purported that his model was 
the ultimate and final version; instead he emphasized the need for re-estimation of 
ratios in different settings, in order to improve the accuracy of the model. The results 
could therefore be improved amongst medical schemes once the assumptions are 
refined and finality reached on where to place the outstanding claims provision and 
savings liability. Altman should be credited for his work on the approach to failure 
prediction rather than dwelling on the accuracy of the Z-score. The approach, as 
described above by Altman (1968), spells out the process in variable selection, which by 
extension infers that re-estimation and reconstitution of variables and coefficients is a 
necessity in order to improve the accuracy of the model. Balcean et al, in their study in 
2004, concluded as follows on the accuracy rates of all commonly used predictive 
models: “we may question the benefits to be gained from using the more sophisticated 
alternative methods”. The more sophisticated alternative models refer to the models 
more recent to the Altman models. What is important from this study (Balcaen & Ooghe, 
2004) though, is that it does not conclude that the MDA or Altman models are inferior or 
are of no value compared to the newer models. This then allows us to apply the Altman 
Z2 with the necessary confidence required particularly since it is also the most practical 
model to apply on an operational level.  
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One of the criticisms leveled at the MDA and logit analysis models is that they are cross 
sectional in nature. They therefore take snap shot views at the circumstances that 
potentially bankrupt and non-bankrupt companies find themselves in at a particular time 
period and classify them into either group based on the pre-specified continuum that 
puts them into a bankrupt, non-bankrupt or indecisive category. Practically, a time 
series scenario can be created by a serial estimation of the Altman Z-score on a 
quarterly basis in order to monitor the movement of the score from the healthy to 
distressed range. 
The theoretical issues around these models are unlikely to be resolved amongst 
researchers as there are now a myriad of new models with new theoretical bases. It is 
expected that the contestation for the “theoretically all inclusive and superior predictive 
model” will continue for a long time. Each study will take its natural course in that other 
researchers who are convinced of the theoretical basis of a model will want to validate it 
to their own circumstances, in order to find practicability in the model. This study has 
done just that with the Altman Z2 by attempting to validate its applicability in the medical 
scheme industry in South Africa, based on the theoretical assumptions of Altman 
(1968). 
The Altman models, with the theoretically sound backing they enjoy, are perhaps as 
relevant today as they were during their inception in the 1960‟s. It can be concluded 
with certainty that the model is still as relevant today as it was in the 1960‟s. 
 
5.1. Comparing variables of failed and non-failed schemes  
 
In the Altman MDA model, all variables except the T5 showed statistically significant 
differences between failed and non-failed companies. Altman nonetheless included T5 
because it had a higher co-efficient (i.e. carrying more weight). There is no statistically 
significant difference in the T1 (working capital / total assets) of the failed and the non-
failed schemes in the overall and open schemes. This observation could be because all 
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schemes (failed and non-failed) generally manage their cash cycles poorly. This reality 
is borne out by the fact that schemes pay hospitals much sooner in return for discounts 
on claims payment. There have been no studies validating that these discounts 
adequately compensate for the reduction in cash flows. This practice does not have any 
sound finance theoretical basis, as shortening the cash cycle reduces schemes‟ cash 
flows.  
The fact that the independent variables are financial ratios, allows managers not only to 
understand the contributory strength of the variables but assist them to possibly work 
out the origins of the failure from a managerial perspective. This has significant 
company “turn around success” implication.      
Further studies are necessary to elucidate the above phenomenon: such as why there 
is no statistically significant difference between the asset turnovers of the failed and 
non-failed schemes. 
 
5.2. Correlation of variables with the Z-score   
 
In general, there was a significant correlation between the earnings and equity/ debt 
ratio (T2, T3 and T4) and the Z-score in all the schemes, whilst there was a strong 
correlation between equity/debt ratio and asset turn over (T4 and T5) with the Z-score in 
all non-failed schemes (overall, open and restrictive). The significance of sales or 
efficient use of assets in achieving sales seems to be a significant driver of the Z-value 
in non-failed schemes. This suggests that significant investment in business 
development is a key strategic consideration and differentiator between failed and non-
failed schemes. This was true even for open schemes where an additional differentiator 
was poor working capital management in failed schemes (correlation between T1 and 
T5). Very interesting to note is the negative correlation between sales and equity (sales 
/ total assets and equity / total sales), suggesting that these schemes either had 
negative sales or were destroying value in the attempt to increase sales resulting in 
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negative cash flows.  
 
5.3. Performance of the MDA model in the SA Medical scheme industry  
 
The accuracy of the Altman model was calculated under two scenarios, first with grey 
zone counts included and secondly with grey zone counts excluded. 
 
5.3.1. Classification and error rates with grey zone counts included 
 
The results of the calculations including the grey zone counts show poor outcomes as 
expected. The general trend for all schemes, one and two years prior to failure, show an 
average predictive value of 60% and above, with an average combined error rate (Type 
I and Type II errors) of around 10%; except in years 2003/2004 and 2004/2005 for one 
year and two years prior to failure (respectively) where the predictive values are both 
48%. Restricted schemes generally performed better than open schemes in both 
predictive values and error rates. 
 
5.3.2. Classification and error rates with grey zone counts excluded 
 
This methodology of excluding the grey zone counts is the preferred one as explained 
above (section 3.5.1. p51). The accuracy rates are much more superior when the grey 
zone counts have been excluded. The average classification rates in the period 2003 to 
2011 are as follows: 82% accuracy rate and 17.9% error rate. The linear trend line 
inserted in the graph shows the accuracy improving from 72% to 91% between the 
period 2003/2004 to 2011/2012. 
This outcome is consistent with the conclusion in previous studies (Aziz and Humayon, 
2006: 27) that showed the accuracy rates in most failure prediction studies to be as 
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follows: 84%, 88%, and 85% for statistical models, AEIS models and theoretical models 
respectively. 
An anomaly was observed in the year 2005/2006 where the accuracy and error rates 
are 45% and 55% respectively and 46% and 54% respectively for two years and one 
year prior to failure respectively. The savings options were introduced in 2005 which 
could be one of the reasons for the inconsistency of the model over this period. Further 
studies are required to elucidate the introduction of savings and the accuracy rate in 
that period.  
5.3.3 The new and alternative Z-scores   
The exercise of establishing new and alternative Z-scores was performed in order to 
complete the understanding of the Altman prediction failure model in the context of the 
South African medical schemes. Hence the considerable effort put into this study to 
better understand the process of co-efficient re-estimation and variable selection.  
It is encouraging to note that the cut-offs points of Alt_MS_Z-score compares favorably 
with the revised Altman Z-score cut-offs: 
> 3.10        = non-failed schemes  
1.5 to 3.10 = grey zone 
< 1.5         = failed schemes  
These values are very close to the Altman model (private firms) cut off values of ≤ 1.23 
and ≥ 2.9 for failed and non-failed schemes respectively 
The rest of the results are otherwise disappointing for the following reasons: 
— Both the new and Alternative Z equations resulted in unexplained negative 
coefficients for some of the variables: 
New_MS_ Z= -1.77T1 - 0.3123T2 -1.733T3 - 0.031T4 + 0.283T5 
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           Alt_MS_Z= -1.03T1 + 0.034T4 + 0.504T5 - 4.467c - 2.70d + 3.93b 
— There is a much better classification accuracy in classifying non-failed schemes 
than in classifying failed schemes 
The practical implication of the above observation is not immediately apparent.  
The following observations are encouraging for further studies in the exercise of 
establishing new and alternative Z-scores amongst SA medical schemes: 
— The probability plots of both MS_Z_scores and Alt_MS_Z-scores are sigmoid in 
shape which serves as a reasonability check.  
— The medians of both MS_Z_values and Alt_MS_Z values for failed and non-
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6. Conclusion  
 
This study has achieved the objective of validating the potential application of the 
Altman failure prediction models in the medical scheme industry and the Altman 
prediction failure model has been validated amongst the South African medical 
schemes. The validation is based on the following outcomes: 
— The average classification rates in the period 2002 to 2011 are as follows: 82% 
accuracy rate and 17.9% error rate, consistent with most statistical MDA failure 
prediction models. 
— There is a statistical difference between the medians of the Z-scores of the failed 
and non-failed schemes. 
— There are different key drivers for the Z-values of failed and non-failed schemes.  
— There are statistical differences between the medians of most of the variables 
(T2, T3, and T4) of the failed and non-failed schemes 
— The model is compliant to a number of reasonability checks; such as correlation  
between T1 and T2 and  
— The model has compliance probability curves.   
 
The benefit of the study is that it has created a deeper understanding of the Altman 
model which paves the way for further studies in the area. 
The nature of the medical scheme sector is such that it presents practical and technical 
difficulties in the application of the model.  
Further studies are required to test the rest of the study objectives under conditions 
where some of the assumptions are revised. 
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The impact of the introduction of the savings options, since 2005, needs to be better 
understood and elucidated.   
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7. ABREVIATIONS  
 
AIES Artificially intelligent expert system  
ARV Antiretroviral  
BOT Board of Trustees  
GEMS  Government Employee Medical Schemes 
GFAs  Generic Failure Agents 
HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immunodeficiency 
 Disease 
LDA Linear discriminate analysis 
MDA Multivariate discriminate analysis 
MDGs Millennium Development Goals  
NHI National Health Insurance  
OPA  Overall Predictive Accuracy  
PMB  Prescribed Minimal Benefit  
PO Principal Officer  
SA South Africa  
SCAs  Sub-causal Agents  
SEP  Single Exit Pricing  
T1 Working capital / total assets 
T2 Retain earnings / total assets 
T3 Earnings before interest and taxes / total assets 
T4 Market value of equity / book values of total liabilities 
T5 Sales / total assets 
TB  Tuberculosis 
US  United States  
Z Overall index  
Z2 Overall index for private firms 
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9. ANNEXURES  
9.1. Annexure A 
 
 List of all failed schemes in order of the year they were registered. 
Name of Medical Scheme Type Year Began Year Failed 
Vulamed Medical Aid Society OPEN 2002/2003 2002/2003 
Pretoria Municipal Medical Aid (PRETMED) OPEN 2002/2003 2003/2004 
AllCare Chamber Medical Aid Scheme OPEN 2002/2003 2003/2004 
Visimed Medical Scheme OPEN 2002/2003 2004/2005 
Omnihealth OPEN 2002/2003 2005/2006 
Medical Expenses Distribution Society (MEDS) OPEN 2002/2003 2005/2006 
Free State Medical Aid Scheme OPEN 2002/2003 2005/2006 
Protector Health OPEN 2002/2003 2006/2007 
Meridian Health OPEN 2002/2003 2007/2008 
Commercial and Industrial Medical Aid Society (CIMAS) OPEN 2002/2003 2007/2008 
Global Health OPEN 2002/2003 2007/2008 
Lifemed Medical Scheme OPEN 2002/2003 2007/2008 
KwaZulu-Natal Medical Aid Scheme OPEN 2002/2003 2008/2009 
MethealthOpenplan Medical Scheme OPEN 2002/2003 2008/2009 
X-Press Care Medical Scheme OPEN 2002/2003 2008/2009 
Pathfinder Medical Scheme OPEN 2002/2003 2008/2009 
Telemed OPEN 2002/2003 2009/2010 
NBC Medical Scheme OPEN 2002/2003 2009/2010 
Medicover 2000 OPEN 2002/2003 2009/2010 
Caremed Medical Scheme OPEN 2002/2003 2010/2011 
Gen-Health Medical Scheme OPEN 2002/2003 2010/2011 
Ingwe Health Plan OPEN 2002/2003 2010/2011 
Pulz Medical Scheme OPEN 2003/2004 2004/2005 
Baymed OPEN 2004/2005 2006/2007 
Eclipse Medical Scheme OPEN 2004/2005 2006/2007 
KPMG Medical Aid Society RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2002/2003 
Ammosal Benefit Society RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2002/2003 
Independent Newspapers Medical Aid Scheme RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2002/2003 
NBS/BOE Group Medical Aid Fund RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2002/2003 
Da Gama Medical Scheme RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2002/2003 
Universal Medical Scheme RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2002/2003 
Aumed Medical Aid Scheme RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2002/2003 
Jomed Medical Scheme RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2003/2004 
Highveld Medical Scheme RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2003/2004 
Billmed Medical Scheme RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2004/2005 
Anglogold Medical Scheme (Goldmed) RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2004/2005 
ABI Medical Aid Scheme RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2004/2005 
G5Med RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2005/2006 
Venda Police and Prisons Medical Scheme (Polprismed) RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2005/2006 
Klerksdorp Medical Benefit Scheme (KDM) RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2006/2007 
Mutual & Federal Medical Aid Fund RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2007/2008 
Ellerines Holdings Medical Aid Society RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2007/2008 
CSIR Medical Scheme RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2007/2008 
Chamber of Mines Medical Aid Society RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2008/2009 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Medical Aid Society 
RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2008/2009 
Cawmed Medical Scheme RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2008/2009 
Samancor Health Plan RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2008/2009 
Stocksmed RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2009/2010 
Alliance Midmed Medical Scheme RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2009/2010 
MEDCOR RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2009/2010 
Umed RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2010/2011 
Alpha Group Medical Scheme RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2010/2011 
Clicks Group Medical Scheme RESTRICTED 2002/2003 2010/2011 
Built Environment Professional Associations Medical Scheme (BEPS) RESTRICTED 2003/2004 2010/2011 
Solvita Medical Scheme RESTRICTED 2008/2009 2009/2010 
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9.2. Annexure B 
 
The following tables are comparisons of the medians of the variables (T1 to T5) and Z-
scores of failed and non-failed schemes (open and restricted), using the Mann-Whitney 
test in the period 2002/2003 to 2011/2012. 
Non-Failed Schemes  









T1 26 -0.08 0.10 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 
T2 26 -0.42 0.74 0.09 0.19 0.05 0.02 0.12 
T3 26 -0.51 0.36 0.00 0.14 -0.01 -0.03 0.06 
T4 25 1.49 19.94 5.72 4.92 3.83 2.40 6.80 






T1 71 -0.14 0.12 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 
T2 71 -0.12 0.48 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.12 
T3 71 -0.59 0.45 0.00 0.13 0.01 -0.06 0.08 
T4 70 0.27 69.60 11.57 11.53 7.62 3.76 15.87 






T1 97 -0.14 0.12 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 
T2 97 -0.42 0.74 0.08 0.13 0.06 0.02 0.12 
T3 97 -0.59 0.45 0.00 0.13 0.00 -0.05 0.07 
T4 95 0.27 69.60 10.03 10.51 5.78 3.21 14.04 
T5 97 0.01 893.01 18.29 92.21 2.30 0.87 6.17 
 
Failed Schemes  









T1 15 -4.24 0.49 -0.29 1.11 0.00 -0.11 0.02 
T2 15 -4.06 0.23 -0.33 1.08 -0.01 -0.11 0.12 
T3 15 -4.07 0.21 -0.40 1.08 -0.09 -0.18 0.07 
T4 15 -5.87 27.67 3.28 7.38 1.50 0.35 4.05 






T1 15 -0.06 0.21 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.05 
T2 16 -0.63 0.25 0.01 0.20 0.02 -0.04 0.15 
T3 16 -0.75 0.21 -0.09 0.24 -0.03 -0.12 0.01 
T4 14 0.16 26.17 5.94 7.45 2.37 1.77 6.75 






T1 30 -4.24 0.49 -0.13 0.79 0.00 -0.03 0.04 
T2 31 -4.06 0.25 -0.15 0.77 0.00 -0.09 0.12 
T3 31 -4.07 0.21 -0.24 0.77 -0.05 -0.15 0.03 
T4 29 -5.87 27.67 4.56 7.40 2.09 0.82 4.58 
T5 30 0.00 13.91 2.41 3.11 1.20 0.75 3.03 
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9.3. Annexure C 
 
The table below illustrates classification and error rates as well as percentage of 
unclassifiable schemes  
Actual Year Prediction(years 
prior to failure) 
Type of scheme Classified Companies Unable to classify 
Classification Rate Error rate 
2003/2004 2 All Schemes NA NA NA 
Open NA NA NA 
Restricted NA NA NA 
1 All Schemes 84% 16% 43% 
Open 81% 19% 66% 
Restricted 85% 15% 30% 
2004/2005 2 All Schemes 84% 16% 43% 
Open 80% 20% 67% 
Restricted 84% 16% 29% 
1 All Schemes 92% 8% 4% 
Open 87% 13% 0% 
Restricted 95% 5% 6% 
2005/2006 2 All Schemes 45% 55% 4% 
Open 81% 19% 0% 
Restricted 95% 5% 6% 
1 All Schemes 46% 54% 10% 
Open 82% 18% 6% 
Restricted 93% 7% 12% 
2006/2007 2 All Schemes 86% 14% 11% 
Open 80% 20% 7% 
Restricted 90% 10% 13% 
1 All Schemes 83% 17% 28% 
Open 78% 22% 26% 
Restricted 86% 14% 29% 
2007/2008 2 All Schemes 83% 17% 28% 
Open 80% 20% 27% 
Restricted 84% 16% 28% 
1 All Schemes 88% 12% 31% 
Open 85% 15% 10% 
Restricted 90% 10% 29% 
2008/2009 2 All Schemes 88% 12% 30% 
Open 88% 13% 33% 
Restricted 88% 12% 28% 
1 All Schemes 84% 16% 26% 
Open 79% 21% 22% 
Restricted 86% 14% 28% 
2009/2010 2 All Schemes 86% 14% 27% 
Open 80% 20% 24% 
Restricted 89% 11% 28% 
1 All Schemes 85% 15% 30% 
Open 80% 20% 35% 
Restricted 87% 13% 27% 
2010/2011 2 All Schemes 89% 11% 28% 
Open 89% 11% 36% 
Restricted 89% 11% 25% 
1 All Schemes 87% 13% 27% 
Open 88% 13% 20% 
Restricted 86% 14% 30% 
2011/2012 2 All Schemes 93% 7% 28% 
Open 96% 5% 22% 
Restricted 92% 8% 30% 
1 All Schemes 93% 7% 21% 
Open 95% 5% 15% 
Restricted 93% 7% 23% 




9.4. Annexure D 
 
This annexure shows the re-substitution and leave-one-out classifications and posterior 
probabilities for those observations that were misclassified by the LDA model. 
Obs 
Classification Probabilities LOO Probabilities 
TRUE Class LOO Cl. 0 1 0 1 
1 1  0 * 0 * 0.5571 0.4429 0.5881 0.4119 
3 1  0 * 0 * 0.7244 0.2756 0.7698 0.2302 
4 1  0 * 0 * 0.6974 0.3026 0.7177 0.2823 
5 1  0 * 0 * 0.7948 0.2052 0.8479 0.1521 
7 1  0 * 0 * 0.6258 0.3742 0.6526 0.3474 
10 1  0 * 0 * 0.6273 0.3727 0.6484 0.3516 
13 1  0 * 0 * 0.5443 0.4557 0.5764 0.4236 
15 1 1 0 * 0.4513 0.5487 0.53 0.47 
16 1  0 * 0 * 0.5802 0.4198 0.5924 0.4076 
17 1  0 * 0 * 0.6294 0.3706 0.6413 0.3587 
19 1  0 * 0 * 0.561 0.439 0.5815 0.4185 
20 1  0 * 0 * 0.5798 0.4202 0.5998 0.4002 
22 1  0 * 0 * 0.6055 0.3945 0.6269 0.3731 
23 1  0 * 0 * 0.5993 0.4007 0.6156 0.3844 
25 1  0 * 0 * 0.5891 0.4109 0.6311 0.3689 
26 1  0 * 0 * 0.5584 0.4416 0.5627 0.4373 
28 1  0 * 0 * 0.5308 0.4692 0.5427 0.4573 
29 1  0 * 0 * 0.6287 0.3713 0.6478 0.3522 
31 1  0 * 0 * 0.5092 0.4908 0.52 0.48 
32 1  0 * 0 * 0.6948 0.3052 0.7152 0.2848 
34 1  0 * 0 * 0.5512 0.4488 0.6029 0.3971 
51 0  1 * 1 * 0.391 0.609 0.3801 0.6199 
54 0  1 * 1 * 0.4514 0.5486 0.4293 0.5707 
57 0  1 * 1 * 0.4529 0.5471 0.4435 0.5565 
58 0  1 * 1 * 0.4908 0.5092 0.4837 0.5163 
62 0  1 * 1 * 0.0801 0.9199 0.0256 0.9744 
72 0  1 * 1 * 0.4082 0.5918 0.0802 0.9198 
77 0  1 * 1 * 0.4702 0.5298 0.4684 0.5316 
82 0  1 * 1 * 0.4844 0.5156 0.4811 0.5189 
98 0  1 * 1 * 0.4601 0.5399 0.4529 0.5471 
100 0  1 * 1 * 0.4648 0.5352 0.4302 0.5698 
102 0  1 * 1 * 0.3553 0.6447 0.3446 0.6554 
103 0  1 * 1 * 0.374 0.626 0.3285 0.6715 
105 0  1 * 1 * 0.4338 0.5662 0.4254 0.5746 
109 0  1 * 1 * 0.466 0.534 0.4606 0.5394 
112 0  1 * 1 * 0.485 0.515 0.4455 0.5545 
115 0  1 * 1 * 0.4275 0.5725 0.418 0.582 
118 0  1 * 1 * 0.199 0.801 0.178 0.822 
119 0  1 * 1 * 0.4566 0.5434 0.4337 0.5663 
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9.5. Annexure E 
 
This annexure shows the re-substitution and leave-one-out classifications and posterior 
probabilities for those observations that were misclassified by the LDA model whilst re-
establishing the Alt_MS_Z-score. 
Obs 
Classification Probabilities LOO Probabilities 
TRUE Class LOO Cl. 0 1 0 1 
1 1 1 0 * 0.4996 0.5004 0.5266 0.4734 
3 1 0 * 0 * 0.8104 0.1896 0.9534 0.0466 
4 1 0 * 0 * 0.549 0.451 0.5834 0.4166 
5 1 0 * 0 * 0.9548 0.0452 0.9798 0.0202 
10 1 0 * 0 * 0.6844 0.3156 0.7089 0.2911 
17 1 0 * 0 * 0.8427 0.1573 0.865 0.135 
20 1 0 * 0 * 0.5772 0.4228 0.6019 0.3981 
22 1 0 * 0 * 0.6086 0.3914 0.6411 0.3589 
23 1 0 * 0 * 0.6965 0.3035 0.7226 0.2774 
24 1 0 * 0 * 0.5547 0.4453 0.5721 0.4279 
26 1 0 * 0 * 0.5631 0.4369 0.5733 0.4267 
28 1 0 * 0 * 0.65 0.35 0.6712 0.3288 
29 1 0 * 0 * 0.6921 0.3079 0.7202 0.2798 
30 1 0 * 0 * 0.5774 0.4226 0.5979 0.4021 
32 1 0 * 0 * 0.7078 0.2922 0.7346 0.2654 
34 1 0 * 0 * 0.6124 0.3876 0.7133 0.2867 
35 1 0 * 0 * 0.5245 0.4755 0.5404 0.4596 
38 1 0 * 0 * 0.5614 0.4386 0.5757 0.4243 
51 0 1 * 1 * 0.4239 0.5761 0.4112 0.5888 
54 0 0 1 * 0.508 0.492 0.4887 0.5113 
60 0 1 * 1 * 0.4966 0.5034 0.4431 0.5569 
62 0 1 * 1 * 0.1036 0.8964 0.0502 0.9498 
70 0 1 * 1 * 0.142 0.858 0.1057 0.8943 
72 0 1 * 1 * 0.1855 0.8145 0.0554 0.9446 
78 0 1 * 1 * 0.3352 0.6648 0.3036 0.6964 
98 0 1 * 1 * 0.3867 0.6133 0.3717 0.6283 
100 0 1 * 1 * 0.4105 0.5895 0.3927 0.6073 
102 0 1 * 1 * 0.4316 0.5684 0.4208 0.5792 
103 0 0 1 * 0.5016 0.4984 0.4906 0.5094 
112 0 1 * 1 * 0.4415 0.5585 0.424 0.576 
115 0 1 * 1 * 0.4894 0.5106 0.4822 0.5178 
118 0 1 * 1 * 0.2938 0.7062 0.2774 0.7226 
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